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Abstract 
 Recent studies suggest that people are anxious about the influence of technology on (and 
in) the future.  The rapidity of technological progress, combined with the failure of technical 
discourses to provide answers in times of uncertainty have forced audiences to find alternative 
means of making sense of their contemporary situation.   
 In particular, narrative forms have become prominent resources for audience’s seeking to 
understand the trajectory of technology and its effects on their lives.  One example of the 
emergence of these types of discourses is the Singularity, a story about a future point where 
human and machine intelligence is indistinguishable and humanity has been transformed by 
technology.  
 As such, in this study, I illuminate and analyze the rhetorical form and function of both 
pro- and anti-Singularity discourse in an effort to understand the contemporary cultural role of 
stories about the future.  In doing so, I argue that advocates of the Singularity employ a mythic 
form of reasoning, combining narrative and technical discourses while characterizing rationality 
in religious terms.  Alternatively, critics of the Singularity warn audiences of the impending 
doom of artificial intelligence (and the like) through a narrative form of secondary allegorizing.  
Finally, I suggest that the prevalence of these competing discourses indicates a possible blurring 
in traditional distinctions between myth and allegory, while also highlighting the changing role 
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Chapter One: Technology and the Future 
In February of 2011, Jeopardy! reunited its two greatest champions, Ken Jennings and 
Brad Rutter, to play against IBM’s Watson, the latest iteration in game-playing machines.  After 
two days, Jennings and Rutter had earned $24,000 and $21,600, respectively; Watson won 
$77,147 (Markoff, 2011).  Watson’s performance was an overwhelming display of “merciless 
efficiency-a description that seems redundant when applied to a state-of-the-art computing 
system” (King, 2011, para 3).  Fitting, then, that Jennings answer to the “Final Jeopardy” 
question skirted substance in favor of praising the machine: “I, for one, welcome our new 
computer overlords” (Markoff, 2011, p.  A1).   
Responses to Watson’s stint on Jeopardy! illustrate two important elements of public 
discourse about technology: inconsistent attitudes about progress and the role of popular culture 
as a means of forming attitudes.  For example, Watson’s success is heralded as a “step forward” 
(“Watson and,” 2011, para 4) or “vindication for the academic field of artificial intelligence,” 
(Markoff, 2011, para 14) and “a significant leap in a machine’s ability to understand context in 
human language” (Paul, 2011, “The Takeaway”).   
Alternatively, Jennings response to Watson illustrates underlying social anxiety about the 
future of technology and its relationship to humanity.  As one commentator writes of Watson’s 
success, “the simple observation that a computer is smarter than us was met with knee-jerk cries 
of ‘No it’s not!’, as if the man-made machine was a threat to our own self-worth” (“Watson 
and,” 2011, para 5).  Satell (2013a) confirms such anxiety, noting that Watson’s exceptional 
performance in a variety of fields raises concerns that “there will be no role left for humans to 
play” (para 7), as intelligent machines emerge as an increasing portion of the workforce.  
Conversations about Watson, then, illustrate the possible existence of competing social 
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perspectives on technology: excitement over its possibilities and anxiety about its long-term 
effects.   
The Public and Technology 
The National Science Foundation (2012) confirms the existence of inconsistent public 
attitudes about science and technology.  Their research suggests that nearly 87% of Americans 
think technology has “helped make society better” (para 6) over the last decade, and will foster 
“more opportunities for the next generation” (para 5).  Yet, while the public is enthused by the 
opportunities implicit in technological progress, a majority of respondents worry that research in 
science and technology fails to recognize the “moral values of society” (para 10) and “makes our 
way of life change too fast” (para 10).  The Pew Research Center (2010) reflects on these 
inconsistent attitudes, noting, “in the mainstream media, particularly on front pages and general 
interest programs, the press reflects exuberance about gadgets and a wonder about the 
corporations behind them, but wariness about effects on our lives” (para 15).   
Additional research attempts to explain these attitudes.  Lee, Scheufele, and Lewenstein 
(2005) argue that the lack of scientific literacy in the general public is “responsible for the 
public’s misperceptions of science and scientists and reservations about new scientific 
developments” (p.  243).  Given the lack of public awareness regarding science and technology, 
people are more likely to use “cognitive shortcuts” (Lee et al, 2005, p.  241) to make sense of 
innovations.  Wagner, Kronberger, and Seifert (2002) explain this as the process of “collective 
symbolic coping” (p.  323).  They contend that while experts are likely to draw on pre-existing 
knowledge and scientific theories, the lay public “refer[s] to the symbolic resources of everyday 
life and public communication” (p.  324) to make sense of unfamiliar issues in science and 
technology.    
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Often, this form of symbolic coping involves popular culture.  For example, one 
commentator notes of Watson, it is a “question answering machine of a type of artificial 
intelligence researchers have struggled with for decades-a computer akin to the one on ‘Star 
Trek’ that can understand questions posed in natural language and answer them” (Markoff, 2011, 
A1).  Similarly, IBM explains of Watson that “the goal was not to create a self-aware super 
computer that can run amok such as HAL 9000 from 2001: A Space Odyssey or Skynet from The 
Terminator” (Paul, 2011, “The Takeaway”), but instead to craft a benevolent technological 
assistant.   
These references to popular science fiction speak to an underlying logic in understanding 
science and technology, “an intermediate stage where the public compensates for a lack of 
scientific literacy by using whatever images and metaphors are at their disposal” (Wagner et al, 
2002, p.  341).  Here, “everyday imaginations” (p.  341) and metaphors are tantamount to 
“technical, scientific, and school knowledge” (p.  326), reducing ambivalence and providing 
frames for judgment.  Some science fiction narratives, then, can play a significant role in social 
attitudes towards technology.   
Science Fiction and Myth Systems 
Rabkin (2004) identifies science fiction as an important intermediary between 
science/technology and public attitudes, writing, “Science fiction is quite naturally the most 
influential cultural system in a time like ours, in which dominant technological change constantly 
provokes hope, fear, guilt, and glory” (p.  462).  Here, inconsistent audience attitudes are worked 
out through important stories, “illustrating fundamental moral dilemmas faced by individuals and 
communities when confronted by new and emerging technologies” (Miller and Bennett, 2008, p.  
600).  Telotte (1993) contends that in providing audiences with a glimpse into the “world of 
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tomorrow” (p.  37), much science fiction acts as a “funhouse mirror” (p.  37) for understanding 
future technological developments. 
This suggests that certain stories go beyond mere entertainment, providing audiences 
with a symbolic means for understanding their experiences.  One way that science fiction does 
this is by drawing on the forms of myth.  Rowland (1990) notes, myths are narrative forms that 
provide transcendent answers for making sense of the unknown.  Miller and Bennett (2008) 
argue for science fiction as this type of form, accounting for rapid technological change.  While 
the “technical realism of many conventional forms of public engagement and technology 
assessment often constrains one to consider only the present, the past, and maybe the near 
future” (p.  601), science fiction “suggests intriguing possibilities that provide needed attention 
to the character, dynamics, and uncertainties of non-linear interactions” (p.  601).  In this way, 
science fiction can serve a function of traditional myths. Here, the mythic function of science 
fiction allows audiences to evaluate the “territory of the future with our minds and hearts” (Brin, 
2006, para 92), emphasizing shared social values as the basis for solutions to cultural crises 
(Rowland, 1990).  The result is a narrative form mapped on top of reality that makes sense of the 
situation and provides direction for the audience.   
If science fiction is a working tool for audiences to make sense of their technological 
conditions, the contemporary dominance of dystopian futuristic accounts would seem to signal 
significant social anxieties about technological progress.  While popular science fiction of the 
1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a fictional world made better through technology, 
contemporary science fiction “in both literature and the cinema- is indeed dystopian” (Milner, 
2012, para 15).  The commercial success and cult-like status attributed to works like The Matrix, 
Blade Runner, and The Terminator series highlight the increasing prevalence of concerns 
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regarding technology.  Or, as Milner (2012) suggests, “If dystopia has once again become 
fashionable in film and literature it’s almost certainly because we too now have much to be 
warned against” (para 22).   
Thus, to resolve attitudinal inconsistency regarding the future of science and technology, 
the public often will turn to stories that make sense of their material conditions and offer frames 
for explaining future developments.  Yet, the contemporary prevalence of negative depictions of 
the future seems to crowd out the possibility of stories of technological optimism.  However, a 
particular strain of discourse has been approached from both utopian and dystopian perspectives. 
The Singularity reflects both optimistic and intensely pessimistic perspectives about the future of 
technology.   
The Singularity 
The Singularity proposes a foundational transformation in the relationship between 
humans, technology, and the future.  As Verner Vinge (1993) explains, “we are on the edge of 
change comparable to the rise of human life on Earth.  The precise cause of this change is the 
imminent creation by technology of entities with greater than human intelligence” (p. 12).  
Borrowing a term from astrophysics that describes “the point inside a black hole where the 
ordinary laws of physics cease to apply” (Kushner, 2009, p.  58), Vinge dubbed this crucial 
moment of change, “the Singularity…a point where our old models must be discarded and a new 
reality rules” (p. 12).  For Vinge, this “inevitable consequence of the humans’ natural 
competitiveness” (p. 16) marks a fundamental shift in what it means to be human.   
Similarly, Ray Kurzweil, a graduate of MIT, member of the Inventors of Hall of Fame, 
recipient of White House honors from three presidents, and winner of the National Medal of 
Technology (Kushner, 2009), argues that advances in technology are the cornerstone of 
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humanity’s future.  For Kurzweil, “The technology of the Singularity will provide practical and 
accessible means for humans to evolve into something greater, so we will no longer need to 
rationalize death as a primary means of giving meaning to life” (2005, p.  326).  In a Singular 
world, “the ravages of old age and even death itself will all be things of the past” (Vance, 2010, 
para 4) as humans will be able to “transfer our minds to sturdier vessels such as computers and 
robots” (Grossman, 2011, para 33).  As “nanobots spread computer intelligence beyond our 
planet, the universe itself will awaken as if a giant switch is finally being turned on” (Kushner, 
2009, p.  60), and humans will participate in the ordering of the cosmos.   
 Importantly, this story is gaining material traction.  The United States Federal 
Government supports research about the Singularity, through both material resources and policy 
provisions favoring entrepreneurial development (Ammori, 2011), and, in conjunction with 
NASA, established a Singularity Institute which hosts annual conferences encouraging 
interdisciplinary research (Vance, 2010).  In December of 2012, Google hired Kurzweil as the 
Director of Engineering, tasked with building “a prodigious artificial intelligence” (Knight, 2013, 
para 1) that can understand natural language and “learn in a way analogous to the way the human 
brain is designed” (Hill, 2013, para 2).  Zorpette (2008) notes of the Singularity, “a lot of smart 
people buy into it” (para 6) and can marshal as evidence a “drumbeat of respectful and 
essentially credulous articles in the science press” (para 7).  
Yet, while support for the Singularity continues to grow, a faction of equally influential 
roboticists, technologists, and computer scientists take a very different approach.  Co-founder of 
Microsoft, Paul Allen, and influential computer scientist, Mark Greaves, argue that Singulitarian 
logic relies too heavily on “unforeseeable and fundamentally unpredictable breakthroughs” 
(2011, para 3) in crucial technological fields.  Horgan (2008) argues that past attempts at 
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predicting greater-than-human intelligence in machines failed miserably, suggesting that the idea 
of the Singularity is a fantasy.  Allen and Greaves (2011) support this argument, noting that 
science is prone to profound paradigm shifts, forcing scientists to “reevaluate portions of what 
they thought they had settled” (para 6), undermining the fidelity of predictive timelines.   
A separate strain of criticism challenges the desirability of the Singularity.  Anissimov 
worries, “If we humans build a more intelligent species, might it replace us? It certainly could, 
and evolutionary and human history support this possibility strongly” (2010, para 5).  For these 
critics, a Singular future is human obsolescence produced by a runaway artificial intelligence, as 
computers would “keep on developing until they were far more intelligent then we are” 
(Grossman, 2011, para 9).  
Thus, discourse regarding the Singularity is illustrative of inconsistency in public 
discussions of technology.  Given that the contemporary state of scientific and technological 
progress lends itself to confusion, various pockets of discourse emerge, emphasizing narrative 
forms and science fiction fulfilling mythic functions.  In the remainder of this study, I use a case 
study of the Singularity to illustrate contemporary utopian and dystopian rhetoric about 
technology.  As such, I argue that the rhetoric of Singularity advocates is defined by utopian 
myth.  Building on Rowland’s (1990) account of mythic rhetoric, I contend that Singulitarians 
reframe material questions of technological progress as symbolic value issues, providing 
audiences with a rhetorical trajectory of humanity reminiscent of optimistic science fiction 
accounts of the future.  The result is a narrative of human evolution that culminates in a symbolic 
resolution to the anxieties of technological progress, the promise of transcendence and 
everlasting life in the merging of humans and machines.  Alternatively, critics of the Singularity 
employ a form of secondary allegory (Milford, 2010), combining historical and narrative 
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examples of technology gone wrong to warn audiences of a future of destruction and encourage 
pessimistic attitudes towards technological progress. 
To demonstrate this argument, I employ an inductive analysis (Campbell & Huxman, 
2003) of the characteristics present in each of the relevant discourses.  This process begins with a 
first sort of the texts, using broad, open-ended categories to discover the available rhetorical 
ingredients.  Such ingredients include themes, tone, strategy, response and others.  Previous 
research suggests that issues related to technology are often approached via myth and allegory in 
those cases where technocratic reason is insufficient.  Therefore, these ingredients are then 
organized according to how they satisfy the formal and functional elements of myth and 
secondary allegory.  Next, using audience-based data regarding public attitudes towards 
technology and the suggestion of leading technology critics that narrative accounts arise as a 
means of resolving inconsistent attitudes, I identify how these themes interact to form influential 
stories about technology.  The goal of this application is to establish the starting points of the 
symbolic equation driving utopian and dystopian discourses about technology and the future.   
Preview of the Study 
I will develop the argument I have described in four additional chapters.  In Chapter Two, 
“Myth, Technology, and the Future,” I will first establish the elements of technocratic discourse, 
necessary for rational or technical approaches to technology and the future. Then, I will review 
the relevant literature on myth to illuminate a limited, rhetorical approach emphasizing form and 
function.  Next, I will detail the changing makeup and role of allegory in contemporary public 
discourse.  Finally, I argue for the value of certain science fiction narratives, variously acting as 
myth or allegory, to inform social and cultural attitudes towards technology and the future.   
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In Chapter Three, “The Rhetoric of the Singularity,” I will first outline the rhetorical 
pattern of utopian discourse.  Then, I will survey the Singularity’s prominent texts to identify the 
formal and functional elements of mythic, utopian rhetoric underlying the arguments for techno-
transcendence.  In particular, I will suggest that much Singularitarian discourse relies on 
characterizing the audience’s encounters with technology in cosmic terms, situating their 
experiences in a long, narrative trajectory of evolution ending in existential transformation.    
In Chapter Four, “The Bomb, the Robot, and the Future,” I will build on the 
contemporary literature regarding secondary allegory, illuminating the form of anti-Singularity 
discourse.  Specifically, I will highlight the use of historical examples, dystopian science fiction 
narratives, and entelechial reasoning to encourage audiences to pessimistically approach 
technology.  
Finally, in Chapter Five, “2045: A Rhetorical Odyssey,” I will first summarize the study, 
followed by a discussion of its implications.  Here, I will argue that understanding the form and 
function of pro- and anti-Singularity rhetoric illuminates the public’s relationship to technology 
and the changing role of narrative in public discourse.    
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Chapter Two: Stories, Technology, and the Future 
In an era dominated by science and technology, much research suggests that alternative 
systems of reasoning (i.e. myths) have lost their power to explain the human condition (Barrett, 
1972; Vignoli, 1978; Barrett, 1987).  At the same time, scientific and technological advances that 
create perceived (or real) threats to society and generate cultural anxiety obligate people to make 
sense of their use of technology and the future (Wagner et al 2002).  In response to these 
concerns, three types of social discourse have developed: scientific accounts, a renewed focus on 
myth as an essential way of understanding the world, and allegorical narratives about the future.  
In this chapter, I illustrate these types of reasoning systems.  First, I describe technocratic 
discourse.  Here, I trace the historical emergence of technical or rationalistic reason, a discourse 
often characterized as a corrective to myth, and identify its characteristics.  Then, I examine the 
relevant literature on the elements of myth.  Specifically, noting the variety of definitions, I 
suggest that a limited definition, one that emphasizes both the formal and functional components 
of myth (Rowland, 1990) offers the most useful approach to rhetorical criticism.  Next, noting 
that many social and cultural stories appear mythic in form but might lack mythic function, I 
argue for a view of allegory as a supplement to myth, bridging the gap between mythic and 
secular realities.  Finally, I describe a particular set of stories, science fiction, which acts as a 
contemporary means for making sense of technological and scientific progress in mythic terms.  
Technocratic Discourse 
Barrett (1987) notes that, “science and technology, have become, as we have seen, the 
driving forces within modern civilization” (p. xiv).  Similarly, Cassirer (1970) contends, “There 
is no second power in our modern world which may be compared to that of scientific thought.  It 
is held to be the summit and consummation of all our human activities, the last chapter in the 
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history of mankind” (p. 207).  Yet, the contemporary dominance of science and technology is not 
a sudden manifestation.  Rather, it is the culmination of nearly three and a half centuries of shifts 
in thinking that have made possible a technical discourse of the present.  
 For example, Vignoli (1978) argues that the Modern Age begins in the hands of Galileo 
and his successors, as “Nature was made subordinate to weight and measure, and to their 
mathematical and mechanical proportions in various phenomena; these were deduced from 
experiment and the use of instruments” (p. 235).  Here, in the laboratories of the seventeenth 
century, scientific experimentation ushered in  
a turn in human reasons, and consequently a transformation of our human being in 
its deepest attitudes toward the world. Humankind turned away from a passive, to 
a more active role in its struggle with nature. Life is given to us to be mastered, 
not as something to drift along with.  (Barrett, 1987, p. 73)  
Merging with governmental and social philosophies of the centuries that followed, Barrett (1972) 
notes, “Science, reason, progress—these became the sacred watchwords of the philosophes of 
the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century” (p. 138).  And, as these discourses became ideals 
for more than the mere practice of science, the technical and industrial age of the present began 
to take shape (Barrett, 1972).  
 Contemporarily, such discourse “has steadily crept into widespread use, not only in the 
social sciences, but also into the languages of business, government, and international policy 
centers” (McKenna & Graham, 2000, p. 224).  In fact, so diffuse is this “technocratic discourse” 
(McKenna & Graham, 2000; Salvador, 1992), which draws from science, technology, and 
history, that Salvador (1992) concludes it is “part of the fabric of American culture” (p. 20).  
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Similarly, such prevalence leads Barrett (1987) to identify science and technology as “the unique 
and central facts of our modern age” (p. xiv).  
 However, as the power of science and technology grew, a separate strain of reasoning 
diminished.  As Cassirer (1970) explains, “In the new light of science mythical perception has to 
fade away” (p. 77).  Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the tension between myth 
and science.  For example, Vignoli (1978) argues that in “arriving at a rational idea of that which 
was originally a fantastic type by divesting it of its wrapping and symbols” (p. 194), science led 
to the unraveling of myth.  Barrett (1972) contends that the transition from myth to science was 
cemented during the Enlightenment, as newfound understanding and control of the natural world 
led humans out of the presumed “night of prehistory: a darkness of myth, superstition, and 
ignorance” (p. 138).  Alternatively, Doty (2004) argues that, in science, “mythic levels of 
understanding and expression are only levels to be gotten beyond” (p. 35) to something more 
pure.  
 Yet, as Barrett (1972) notes, while myth might lack a “meticulous fidelity to external 
facts” (p. 22), it accesses “a truth about man and his cosmos that may be lost under the details of 
documentation” (p. 22).  Here, the “fragmentation of experience” (Barrett, 1972, p. 61) wrought 
by the dissipation of myth into purely rational ideas (Vignoli, 1978) has dissolved “the network 
of familiar meanings that make up our world in order to replace them by some systems of 
meanings of a different, and allegedly more comprehensive, order” (Barrett, 1972, p. 39).  As 
“an exhibition of the power of the human mind, of its freedom and originality to construct 
concepts that are not passively found in nature” (Barrett, 1987, p. xv), science, perhaps more 
than any other facet of human experience, exemplifies the Protagorean maxim, humans are the 
measure of all things (Barrett, 1972).  But, as Barrett (1972) writes,  
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Man cannot find meaning in himself, not in himself alone anyway; he must feel 
part of something greater than himself…he must feel that he belongs to something 
cosmic that is not of man and not of men, and least of all man-made, but toward 
which in the deepest part of himself he can never feel alien.  (p. 141)  
Thus, to find that thing beyond the discourses of science and rationality, variously described as 
“the soul” (Vignoli, 1978, p. 238), or the “mystery that baffles the understanding” (Barrett, 1972, 
p. 141), humans frequently turn to back to the form out of which science emerged, myth. 
A Definition of Myth 
A survey of literature reveals a variety of perspectives that inform definitions of myth.   
For example, some scholars emphasize myth as a means of sense-making.  Waardenburg (1980) 
notes, myths are “a particular form in which humans mentally digest and assimilate reality 
insofar as it makes itself palpable as an overpowering phenomena” (p. 58).  Similarly, Doty 
(2004) contends that myths provide “society and its individuals with possible projected models, 
with creative ways of seeing the ‘deep’ significance of apparently insignificant events and 
images, and with the knowledge that ground value structures that provide foundations for a better 
future” (p. 30).  
 A separate strain of scholarship describes myth as a means of social bonding.  Kelley-
Romano (2006) discusses myth as “the glue of society that binds us to one another and to our 
traditions” (p. 385), akin to Doty’s assertion that myths provide societies with cues as to which 
“powers (divine or otherwise) are to be respected and in which order they are to be approached” 
(2004, p. 23).  Nelson (1989) underscores the importance of such social cohesion, concluding 
that myths are “symbolic stories of the whole” (p. 176) that provide communities a sense of 
shared order.  Campbell’s seminal account, The Power of Myth (1989), explains myth as “a field 
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of reference to what is absolutely transcendent” (p. 58), identifying a fundamental substance 
common to each member of a society.   
 Other scholars focus on formal elements, but tend to downplay how myths function.  For 
example, Rushing’s (1985) assessment of “E.T. as Rhetorical Transcendence” identifies 
archetypal symbols interacting against a fundamentally mythic backdrop, focusing on the perils 
of technology and the sanctity of humanity.  Similarly, Rushing’s work on Star Wars (1986) 
illustrates how an audience could see mythic tensions between technology and humanity, but 
lacks evidence that audience’s treated the stories as “true” accounts of their struggles with like 
issues.   
 Definitions of myth like Rushing’s can be, as Rowland (1990) notes, “critically 
dangerous” (p. 107), emphasizing either extremely broad notions of myth or approaches that fail 
to emphasize a relationship between the form and function of myth.  Instead, a narrow definition 
synthesizing a variety of functional and formal elements serves a useful critical purpose.   
Rowland’s (1990) limiting approach to myth, as stories that provide symbolic solutions to social 
problems where rational, technical, or scientific means fail, illuminates both the functional and 
formal components of myth.   
The Functional Elements of Myth  
A number of scholars have theorized on the functions of myth.  For example, Doty 
(2004) contends that myths teach social attitudes by signifying and coalescing values, stories, or 
projections that “have been found worthy of repetition and replication” [emphasis in original] (p.  
20).  Kelley-Romano (2006) suggests that myths “explain the unexplainable and provide comfort 
in times of uncertainty” (p. 385).  And, Vignoli (1978) argues that myths are the “psychical and 
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physical mode in which man projects himself into all those phenomena which he is able to 
apprehend and perceive” (p. 1).   
Much of this theorizing draws from or contributes to Campbell’s (1988) assessment that 
myths serve four functions.  First, myths serve a mystical function, opening the world to the 
“dimensions of mystery, to the realization of the mystery that underlies all forms” (p. 38).  
Second, myths act cosmologically, “showing you what the shape of the universe is” (p. 39).  
Third, myths serve sociological functions, “supporting or validating a social order” (p. 39).  
Finally, myths are pedagogical, demonstrating how to “live a human lifetime under any 
circumstances” (p. 39).   
Yet, as Rowland (1990) notes, “While there is disagreement over the functions served by 
myth, a closer look reveals that all of the functions…can be treated as part of a larger function, 
answering human problems that cannot be answered discursively” (p. 102).  In accordance with 
this larger aim of myth, I suggest that myths serve two interrelated sub-functions to resolve the 
social or cultural crises to which Rowland refers: translating material conditions of present social 
or cultural crises into symbolic terms, and establishing transcendent frames for understanding 
human experience.   
Material conditions and symbolic terms.  Myths are necessary when social or cultural 
crises cannot be resolved by rational, technical, or scientific means.  Underlying the success of 
the myth, however, is the audience’s acceptance of the narrative as illustrative of their material 
conditions.  For example, Rowland (1990) discusses myths as “framing stories” (p. 103).  He 
argues that, while the events of the myth might not accurately reflect history, the story is treated 
as “true” in the culture in which it is told.  This assessment illuminates the relationship between 
the material and symbolic elements of a myth.  While the story might not occur in a time or place 
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that looks like the audience’s environment, the theme of the story or the values in question are 
similar to contemporary cultural or social crises, relating the narrative to the audience.  Thus, the 
details of the myth are less important than the audience’s ability to see themselves in the 
situation.  Or, as Gehmann (2003) contends, myths craft a “world ‘as it is’ being of relevance for 
us” (p. 105), while also providing a transcendent frame for understanding.  
 Thus, the first sub-function of myth is to bridge the gap between the audience’s material 
conditions and the symbolic space of the narrative.  To accomplish this, myths emphasize the 
fundamental relationships between the characters, scenes, and plots of the story and the 
audience’s crisis.  Having identified with the myth, the audience can then begin to extract from 
the narrative the symbolic resources it offers to overcome the problems unaccounted for by 
rational, technical, or scientific means.   
 Specifically, humans confront a variety of social and cultural crises, some of which 
require the use of discursive reasoning.  For example, the recent spread of Avian Flu, the 
economic recession of 2008, and anthropogenic climate change are problems best accounted for 
by scientific or technical analysis.  Yet, these systems of logic have their limits.  While each 
might resolve a subset of the problems individuals and societies face, they cannot account for a 
variety of equally significant issues.  Specifically, “Discursive reasoning cannot justify the good 
society, answer basic moral conflicts, or aid the individual in confronting psychological crises.  
There are no purely rational answers to such problems” (Rowland, 1990, p. 103).  Similarly, 
Doty (2004) contends that recourse to natural sciences might give insight to “how” a problem 
arose, but it fails to interrogate what the problem signifies, how humans relate to it, and what 
powers/deities should be worshipped or respected in its interrogation.  Thus, myth is crucial in 
providing meaning beyond the explanations offered by science.   
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 For these problems, humans turn to myth.  As Rowland (1990) notes, “The function of 
myth is to transcend ordinary life and provide meaningful grounding for that which cannot be 
supported rationally” (p. 103).  To accomplish this, mythic reasoning describes the world in a 
transcendent way so that it might offer an alternative means for interpretation or judgment 
(Cassirer, 1970).  Scholars assess mythic descriptions of the world in a number of ways.  For 
instance, Campbell (1988) discusses “the homeland of the muses” (p. 65), where art and poetry 
become the languages by which audiences participate in their social structures.  And Cassirer 
(1970) notes, “The world of myth is a dramatic world—a world of actions, of forces, of 
conflicting powers.  In every phenomenon of nature it sees the collision of these powers” (p. 76).  
Implicit in each of these descriptions is a sense that purely rational discourses lack access to 
important realms of human experience.  This is in-line with Rowland’s (1990) suggestion that 
mythic reasoning can provide a sense of value in answering the technical problems “not subject 
to rational solution” (p. 102). 
 Transcendence.  The final function of myth is to establish the individual’s place in the 
universe.  As Campbell (1988) suggests, “I think what we are looking for is a way of 
experiencing the world that will open to us the transcendent that informs it, and at the same times 
forms ourselves within it.  That is what people want.  That is what the soul asks for” (p. 61).  
Kelley-Romano (2006) confirms this assessment, noting that the myth’s power is “in the realm 
of transcendent” (p. 389). This mythic function underlies the long history of storytelling as a 
means to “deal with the crises of life” (Rowland, 1990, p. 102).  Kelley-Romano (2006) argues 
that this mythic function “has always been a main component of theological and mythological 
philosophies” (p. 388), extending at least as far back as the Greco-Roman period.   
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Campbell describes a “cosmological function” (1988, p. 39) that highlights a fundamental 
tenet of mythic reasoning: “people need to have faith that there is a meaning to life” (emphasis 
mine, Kelley-Romano, 2006, p. 389).  Similarly, Cassirer (1970) discusses “an implied act of 
belief” (emphasis in original, p. 75) in mythical imagination.  This explains why religious 
systems tend to be the most accepted myths of a society, influencing nearly every aspect of life 
(Kelley-Romano, 2006).  In myth, which is “from its very beginning potential religion” 
(Cassirer, 1970, p. 87), humans choose to see the interconnectedness of life and the power of the 
universe.   
In offering a rationale beyond the means of technical and scientific discourse, myth 
speaks to the power of stories as meaning-making devices.  Additionally, the transcendent 
function of myth illuminates the human need to believe in “something beyond,” a greater 
explanation or power, deity or otherwise, that weaves together the fabric of human experience.  
Finally, this function synthesizes the whole of myth.  In setting the audience’s crisis against the 
backdrop of a larger cosmic order, myth offers a new way of seeing the situation.  And, in 
expanding the context of the crisis as part of an interrelated drama of the universe, myth also 
expands the solutions available to the audience.  Perhaps this is why Doty (2004) concludes that 
myths are “the backbones of practical ways of living realistically” (p. 3).   
The Formal Elements of Myth  
 Rowland (1990) notes that there are five formal components of myths.  First, myths are 
stories, each with “a beginning, middle, and end” (Kelley-Romano, 2006, p. 386).  Yet, in 
distinction from historical, rational, or technical accounts, mythic stories “possess a unique 
power to symbolically ‘solve’ social problems not possessed by other symbolic forms, because 
the rules of discursive logic do not apply” (Rowland, 1990, p. 103).  For this reason, Campbell 
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(1988) concludes that multiple, inconsistent versions of the same myth might exist, or that myths 
might even be self-contradictory, but remain true for particular audiences.   
Second, the main characters in a myth “must be heroic” (Rowland, 1990, p. 104).  
Rushing (1985) highlights the importance of this element, writing, “the central rhetorical symbol 
in a myth is generally a cultural hero” (p. 192).  Typically, the hero journeys into an alternative 
realm, is “tested by a monster or villain” (Rushing, 1985, p. 192) and returns transformed 
(Campbell, 1988).  Average characters lack the necessary courage to brave uncharted and new 
territory and, as such, the hero’s evolution brings the rest of the social group into maturity 
(Campbell, 1988; Rushing, 1985).  And, as Rowland (1990) notes, the greater the social problem, 
the greater the heroism required of the protagonist.   
The third and fourth formal elements of myth relate to the time and place of the story.  
Temporally, myths exist either in a special time, set aside from “normal historical time” 
(Rowland, 1990, p. 104), or in a period considered mythic because of its significant, symbolic 
meaning.  Mason (1980) notes that, in myths, “time accelerates and slows, condenses and 
elongates” (p. 16).  Procter (1992) justifies such a treatment of chronology, arguing that in 
bending time myths are capable of mixing past and future, allowing rhetors to regenerate stories 
from another time and graft them over contemporary issues (Procter, 1992).  Additionally, myths 
exist in a special place, “outside of the normal world or in a real place possessing special 
symbolic power” (Rowland, 1990, p. 104), places that are often sacred.  
Finally, myths rely heavily on archetypal language.  Here, enduring symbols like blood 
and water (Rowland, 1990), prevalent throughout many myths, represent fundamental elements 
of life that transcend cultural boundaries. As Rowland observes, “because archetypes function as 
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the most powerful symbols in a society it makes sense that they would be present in myth” 
(1990, p. 104).  
Thus, as Campbell (1988) notes, myths provide “a way of experiencing the world that 
will open to us the transcendent that informs it, and at the same times forms ourselves within it.  
That is what people want. That is what the soul asks for” (p. 61).  Here, myths speak to a deeper 
meaning of humanity and the universe, one that transcends the cultural, social, or temporal 
settings that define contemporary situations (Kelly-Romano, 2006).  The result is a set of similar 
formal elements appearing across various cultures and times, a combination that speaks more 
generally to the human condition (Campbell, 1988). 
Through this definition of mythic form, I hope to illustrate the elements that build a 
mythic narrative.  The formal elements in combination allow myths to perform functions for 
which other forms are inadequate.  Waardenburg (1980) notes, 
Each element of the myth has to some extent a symbolic connotation, and the 
combination of these elements confers a new symbolic meaning of its own, for the 
plot itself unfolded in the story refers to a reality or truth which is represented as 
an event of great consequences and implications.  These symbolizations together 
indicate the meaning of the myth, which in most cases is proclaimed to be a truth 
upon which the ordinary world and immediate reality or parts of it are based, so 
that through the myth, world and life can be seen in their real nature.  (p. 53)   
Myths, then, combine a variety of formal elements to reveal the “true” nature of reality that 
exists transcendentally in the space of the narrative.  
As stories for living, those narrative forms that achieve mythic status must change with 
the times to account for evolving material conditions (Procter, 1992).  However, Campbell 
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(1988) laments the fact that the contemporary pace of technological progress makes life change 
so rapidly that myths cannot weave together the social fabric as they once did.  Yet, Wagner et al 
(2002) contend that “people are under pressure” (p. 338) to come to terms with the rapidity of 
scientific and technological change, justifying the use of collective symbolic coping mechanisms 
(i.e. myth).  Phair (2010) offers a possible solution for this problem, arguing that allegory can act 
as a bridge, reconciling the tensions between myth(s) and secular reality, while still offering the 
audience symbolic solutions to social and cultural crises.  As such, in the next section, I lay out a 
theory of allegory that emphasizes its ability to function in ways similar to myth while also 
accounting for the types of challenges posed to narrative systems of reasoning in an increasingly 
technical world.   
Allegory 
Research illuminates two dominant and competing interpretations of allegory (Milford & 
Rowland, 2012; Milford, 2010; Phair, 2010).  Broadly identified as traditional and postmodern 
approaches to allegory, a variety of theorists have engaged the form and function of this strategy.  
In this section, and building on contemporary works that describe a version of allegory that 
emphasizes functional rather than formal elements (Milford & Rowland, 2012; Phair, 2010), I 
argue that allegory is one way audiences symbolically extract (Milford, 2010) ideological or 
mythical meaning from narrative, many of which have the form of myth but that are not seen as 
true stories.  I suggest that this type of allegory, which draws from but is not beholden to 
ideological or sacred pretexts, acts as a supplement to those discourses exhibiting both the form 
and the believed-as-true (Rowland, 1990) character of myth.  To illustrate this argument, I first 
define traditional and postmodern approaches to allegory, then identify a situated version of 
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allegory, secondary allegory (Milford, 2010), and explain how it acts as an effective, symbolic 
sense-making tool.  
Traditional Allegory  
 Traditional interpretations of allegory emphasize a close relationship between the surface 
narrative and the underlying referent, such that the audience is guided towards the intended 
meaning.  As Milford (2010) notes, “Classically allegory was defined as a message in which a 
text serves as a vehicle for a fixed ideological message informed by a pretext” (p. 18).  Here, the 
success of the allegory relies on two key elements.  The first is the existence of a pretext, “which 
comes before the text, usually a myth or ideological narrative” (Milford & Rowland, 2012, p. 
537) that “(p)reaches through the surface narrative producing a deeper level of consideration” (p. 
538) and meaning.  Phair (2010) clarifies the importance of meaning added by the pretext, 
arguing, “Generally, this meaning is seen as something that is transcendent and connected to 
ideological convictions, religion being the most common example” (p. 108).  
 Yet, the mere existence of a pretext does not guarantee that the audience will read the 
narrative for its intended purpose.  For instance, Fletcher (2006) describes the allegory and its 
pretext as existing on either side of a “hermeneutical wall” (p. 78).  For the allegory to work, 
each side must be “cognizant of the other’s activity” (p. 78).  Thus, the second element of 
successful allegory is the audience’s ability to engage the narrative while recognizing and 
making use of the ideological, mythic, or sacred pretext.  Bruns (1988) discusses this as the need 
to read the text “in the right spirit” (p. 385), requiring the audience to embrace the transcendent, 
“spiritual sense” (p. 385) beyond the surface of the narrative.  Milford and Rowland (2012) 
underscore the importance of this element, writing that, “An audience that lacks the pretext will 
not understand the allegory and an audience loyal to the pretext will reject any treatment that 
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does not reinforce the underlying myth or ideology” (p. 538).  Thus, traditional interpretations of 
allegory treat it as a “focusing lens” (Milford, 2010, p. 18), illuminating the narrative through the 
symbolic pretext.  
Postmodern Allegory 
 While traditional allegory focuses the audience’s attention on “a hidden meaning 
intentionally placed in the text by the allegorist” (Phair, 2010, p. 108), postmodern allegory 
expands the scope of potential meanings.  As Milford (2010) notes, “the postmodern approach 
views the text as a collage of images designed to promote a diversity of conclusions” (p. 18).  At 
the heart of the distinction between traditional and postmodern approaches are the role of the 
pretext and the means of interpretation.  Milford and Rowland (2012) argue that, “Where the 
traditional allegory relies on the audience’s knowledge of a pre-existing myth or ideology to 
reinforce a particular interpretation postmodern allegory relies on polyvalent symbols, that 
possess multiple meanings…to support a number of potential interpretations” (p. 538).  
However, the lack of a direct referent necessarily changes the way the audience understands the 
surface material.  Specifically, “By using a pastiche of images, the rhetor is able to greatly 
expand the frame of reference” (Milford, 2010, p. 22) and, “As a result, allegory becomes less 
about a connection between the ideological pretext and the text, and more about providing a 
direction that allows the audience to see whatever they choose” (p. 22).   
 Thus, traditional and postmodern approaches to allegory differ: one emphasizes a close 
relationship between the text and its intended ideological, mythic, or sacred pretext, the other 
cobbles together a variety of possible symbolic relationships, allowing the audience to choose 
their own allegorical adventure.  Yet, while they appear contrasting in nature, Milford (2010) 
argues for a view of allegory that would treat the traditional and postmodern interpretations as 
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complementary.  He suggests, “the most appropriate means of testing traditional allegory in 
contemporary culture is not an analysis of the text but with a thorough consideration of 
secondary texts discussing the original allegory” (p. 19).  Here, the “allegory occurs when an 
audience appropriates a text that is structurally a postmodern allegory and interprets it in a 
traditional fashion, imbuing it with ideological power via a pretext” (p. 20).  
 Secondary allegory. The notion of “secondary allegory,” which has the audience extract 
ideological meaning from a text and frame it around a not necessarily sacred pretext seems 
useful.  For example, Hariman (2002) calls for an understanding of allegory as equipment for 
“people to make sense of their lives in a period of accelerated cultural change characterized by 
pluralism, fragmentation, and inevitably provisional forms of community” (p. 288).  Here, the 
use of secondary allegory allows the allegorist to take parts of mythic systems and sprinkle them 
in among new cultural stories such that the ideological pretext remains, if slightly modified in its 
interpretation by the changing cultural landscape.  In this sense, secondary allegory can function 
as a supplement to myth.  While many stories might appear mythic in form, they might lack a 
believed-to-be-true quality because of the audience’s inability to reconcile the material 
conditions of the present with the symbolic elements of the narrative.  A particular set of stories, 
science fiction, emphasizes mythic elements with “heavy doses of allegorical writing” (Hariman, 
2002, p. 271).  
Doll and Faller (1986) note, “Science fiction reflects a fear of life in the future, 
particularly a fear that we are destroying ourselves through science and technology” (p. 92).  
While this form is often overtly “mythic literature with potently political implications” (Nelson, 
1989, p. 176), the audience may not believe it to be true in the same way a religious audience 
might embrace their sacred texts.  Thus, in the next section, I describe a version of science fiction 
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that exhibits formal mythic qualities, while functioning allegorically, allowing audiences to 
extract symbolic elements from a variety of narratives, crafting a more comprehensive approach 
to science and technology.   
Science Fiction as Symbolic Form 
 In Profiles of the Future (1964), Arthur C. Clarke mused, “It is impossible to predict the 
future and all attempts to do so in any detail appear ludicrous within a very few years” (xi).  
There is, however, hope for those few versed in the language of prediction.  He writes, “I do not 
for a moment suggest that more than 1 percent of science fiction readers would be effective 
prophets; but I do suggest that almost 100 percent of reliable prophets would be science fiction 
readers—or writers” (xiii).  In this section, and building on Clarke’s assessment, I argue that 
science fiction can make sense of social or cultural crises regarding technology through 
narratives of the future.  It is important to recognize that it is beyond the scope of this study to 
assess the entire science fiction genre.  With a nearly innumerable number of texts, and an 
equally daunting number of generic definitions, I have chosen to limit this analysis to science 
fiction narratives concerned with technological advances, especially a future in which computers 
become self-aware.  
 Milner (2010) notes that, as a genre, science fiction developed in “nineteenth-century 
Europe through a radical redistribution of interests towards science and technology” (p. 157).  As 
such, a working definition of science fiction sees the genre as “the branch of fantastic literature 
that claims plausibility against a background of science” (Rabkin, 2004, p. 459).  Central to this 
definition, and perhaps more generally the endurance and function of science fiction, is narrative.  
As Miller and Bennett (2008) argue, the power of the genre to “shape the public imagination of 
science and technology derives fundamentally from its form of narrative story-telling” (p. 600), 
	   26 
which “departs markedly from the forms of technical rationality common to more classic 
approaches to thinking longer term about technology” (p. 600).   
 Two qualities exist in those stories that function to resolve technological anxiety.  First, 
the drama is set in the future and in a world made different through technology (Doll & Faller, 
1986).  Such a setting underscores “one of the abiding themes of science fiction, the utopian 
effort to design a different and, one hopes, better worlds” (Telotte, 1993, p. 29).  For example, 
the Star Trek universe is set in a future time where “technological innovation has effectively 
solved the practical problems confounding humanity” (Milner, 2012, para 9), and “poverty, 
inequality and social conflict have been eliminated, so that both genders, all races and various 
sexualities are equal” (para 11).  In this world, “people travel the galaxy in star-ships, their food 
and drink supplied by replicators, their fantasies enacted out and fulfilled in holodecks” (para 
10).  Here, the setting of the drama is kept at a distance far enough from the audience to seem 
“fantastic, unbelievable and unrealistic or—according to taste—marvellous [sic] and wonderful” 
(Milner, 2010, p. 166).  The audience, awed by the utopian-like future of their world, is expected 
to conclude that technology is a harbinger of prosperity.   
 Similarly, much of Isaac Asimov’s work approaches technology from an optimistic 
perspective.  In The Caves of Steel (1991), the first of Asimov’s famed “Robot Trilogy,” Earth 
has been drastically altered by scientific and technological innovation.  Cities do not exist as they 
once did, now merged by large domes that cross state lines.  Humans have been stratified, and 
their social locations marked by their relationship to technology.  Most live under the domes 
alongside robots, clunky machines with only faint simulations of humanness.  Some, however, 
live in smaller colonies on other planets.  This elite class, “Spacers,” live extended, comfortable 
lives with advanced technology and robots that are indistinguishable from humans.  In Asimov’s 
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universe, as is true of much classic science fiction, there can be harmony in an unfamiliar world 
of advanced technology.   
Yet, anxieties regarding science and technology have also led to pessimistic accounts of 
the future.  These dystopian stories often invoke “a basic paradox: the omnipotence of human 
science and the fragility of human society” (Doll & Faller, 1986, p. 92), and reflect a fear that 
“we are destroying ourselves through science and technology” (p. 92).  Cyberpunk is the one of 
the most recent iterations of these dystopian themes.  Its modifications to the science fiction 
genre, generally, illustrate how modern audiences use the form to make sense of “too rapid 
technological progress” (Doll & Faller, 1986, p. 98).  For example, Renegar and Dionisopoulos 
(2011) note that while much science fiction used to take place hundreds (if not thousands) of 
years in the future and potentially on distant planets, the modern proliferation of dystopian texts, 
characterized by the cyber-punk aesthetic of the 1980s, has ushered in a wave of stories set in the 
“not-too-distant-future” (p.  324).  In the dystopian worlds of cyberpunk science fiction, “The 
technology and artifacts of the present are evolved and imagined as part of the future, resulting in 
a world that is simultaneously familiar and strange” (Renegar & Dionisopoulos, 2011, p. 324).  
Sponsler (1992) echoes this description, writing, “cyberpunk typically presents a montage of 
surface images, cultural artifacts, and decentered subjects moving through a shattered, affectless 
landscape” (p. 627).   
Rushing and Frentz (1989) note, much dystopian discourse confronts a future of 
“increasing mechanization of the human and humanization of the machine, a process moving 
toward an ultimate end in which the machine is god and the human is reduced either to slavery or 
obsolescence” (p. 62).  Similarly, Doll and Faller (1986) contend that a tenet of this science 
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fiction type emphasizes the societal fears of over-dependence on machines, and a loss of identity 
as the lines between “the natural and the artificial are obliterated” (p. 94).   
These themes are prevalent in many modern science fiction classics, especially in works 
translated onto film.  For example, The Terminator (1984) provides glimpses of a future of war, 
where a “landscape of discarded metal and human bones is all there is” (Rushing & Frentz, 1989, 
p. 71).  The setting, only 45 years removed from the present, implicates a future of ultra-
intelligent technology as a world of conflict, drastically different from the utopian ends offered 
in previous iterations of the genre.  Much of Philip K. Dick’s work, which has found 
unprecedented posthumous traction in popular culture, engages the problems of scientific and 
technological innovation.  In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (1968), the basis for Blade 
Runner (1982) and one of Dick’s most prominent works, the drama occurs in a post-apocalyptic 
1992.  Set only 24 years after its publication date, the Earth is in some ways similar to that era.  
Social structure, class division, and religion remain.  Yet, its inhabitants seem vastly different.  
The population now worships electric animals, and is interspersed with human-like androids, 
some with homicidal tendencies.   
Thus, implicit in the utopian and dystopian sub-genres of science fiction is a difference in 
attitude.  While a great deal of science fiction presents a broadly positive view of the problem of 
the human relationship to science and technology, its distance from the present is noteworthy.  
Some science fiction tends to approach science and technology from a long-term perspective, 
asking audiences to imagine a world in which periods of social and scientific change have led to 
fantastic technologies and improved lives.  Other science fiction, typified by the cyberpunk 
aesthetic, suggests that technological innovation leads to a dystopian future.  The popularity of 
this genre indicates anxiety about the future of modern society.  
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 The second quality of this particular type of science fiction regards its function.  Burke 
(1973) notes that certain stories act as more than mere fiction, offering audiences “strategies for 
dealing with situations” (p. 296).  In keeping with this assessment, I argue that those science 
fiction texts that resolve technological anxiety function as “equipment for living” (p. 304) in a 
world of scientific and technological change.  
Isaac Asimov’s work illustrates this point.  In the introduction to The Caves of Steel 
(1991), Asimov notes that in the wake of World War I, “it became very common in the 1920s 
and 1930s, to picture robots as dangerous devices that invariably destroyed their creators” (p.  
vii). Yet, he saw this as the incorrect response to science and technology.   He continues,  
I could not bring myself to believe that if knowledge presented danger, the 
solution was ignorance.  To me, it always seemed that the solution had to be 
wisdom.  You did not refuse to look at danger, rather you learned how to handle it 
safely.  (p. viii)   
As such, he set out to tell a sympathetic tale of robots, one that articulated how humans and 
technology might peacefully co-exist.   
 In an introduction to Robert A. Heinlein’s For Us, the Living (2004), a posthumous 
publication described by some critics as Heinlein’s “first novel” (xi), Spider Robinson argues 
that Heinlein’s motive was to disguise “a series of lectures as fiction” (p. xiii).  As Heinlein’s 
ideas were “wildly ahead of their time, radical, and opposed by powerful societal institutions” (p. 
xiii) in 1939, they fell flat as academic lectures.  However, Heinlein noticed that the fiction he 
laced throughout the essays, often merely attempts at garnering the audience’s interest, was 
gaining attention.  And so, in that realization, he turned to storytelling that could “still end up 
putting across every insight and opinion he felt the world needed to hear” (p. xv).  Rushing and 
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Frentz (1989) echo this sentiment, arguing that, “the most profound insights into how technology 
is and might be experienced by the culture as a whole often emanate from the literary and 
cinematic genre of science fiction” (p. 61).  
 In an epilogue to 2001: A Space Odyssey (1982), Arthur C. Clarke discusses the political 
function of science fiction.  After seeing some of the imaginings of 2001 come to fruition in both 
the Apollo and Voyager missions of the 1970s, Clarke pondered the relationship between science 
fiction authors and the engineers of the future.  He notes, “Science fiction writers very seldom 
attempt to predict the future; indeed, as Ray Bradbury put it so well, they more often try to 
prevent it” (p. 225).  Nelson (1989) confirms this corrective function of science fiction, writing, 
“The challenge is not to enter an early judgment, so that the prophet can later say: I told you so” 
(p. 182). Instead, he argues that the purpose of science fiction is “to proceive [sic] the possibility 
so repugnantly that it will not occur at all, or at least that it will not occur as awfully and 
enduringly as it might otherwise” (p. 182).  
 Renegar and Dionisopoulos (2011) argue that these suggestive or corrective motives are 
accomplished by providing “enough critical distance from the present to invite self-reflection” 
(p. 336).  Telotte (1993) contends that these fictive portrayals are uniquely important because of 
“how lightly we often take the very elements—science and technology—that can work such 
transformations” (p. 38).  In imagining the manifestation of the audience’s decisions and actions, 
science fiction exposes the underlying assumptions and implications (Renegar & Dionisopoulos, 
2011), creating “a kind of double vision: exploiting the attractions of the technological while also 
questioning its effects on humanity” (Telotte, 1993, p. 28).  
Thus, some science fiction exhibits the formal elements of myth while functioning 
allegorically for the audience.  In doing so, these stories allow the audience to extract narrative 
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elements and treat them as symbolic resources for resolving social or cultural crises.  Unlike 
traditional myths, science fiction is not believed as true.  Rather, audiences often treat the 
narrative as a secondary allegory, drawing meaning from it, informing social or cultural 
discourses that confront the benefits and perils of technology.  
Conclusion 
The scientific discourse established in the seventeenth century, articulated in the 
Enlightenment, and manifest in contemporary conversations about the future of technology are 
inadequate in providing meaning for certain audiences as they confront uncertainty related to 
science and technology.  Much Golden Age science fiction told stories of progress through 
technology, stories that were thematically consistent with the technocratic discourse. Yet, 
failures of technology inevitably created anxiety leading to an alternative, more negative 
approach, as a form of secondary allegorizing.  Here, some science fiction possessing the form of 
myth provides audiences with a symbolic means for understanding their place in the universe 
against the backdrop of rapid technological progress.  These dystopian narratives provide an 
altogether different vision than the Golden Age stories.  Building on these ideas, in the next 
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Chapter Three: The Rhetoric of the Singularity 
Americans are anxious about the future.  Dystopian themes, common in contemporary 
popular culture accounts of science, attempt to caution audiences against the ubiquity of 
technology. Similarly, and more generally, public attitudes towards the future are bleak.  The 
Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research recently published a poll suggesting 
that 54% of Americans think life will be worse in 2050, with a number of respondents citing 
technology as a reason for such decline (Associated Press, 2014).  
 Yet, despite the prevalence of anti-technology sentiments, a particular strain of optimistic 
discourse resonates with a growing sub-culture (Grossman, 2011).  The Singularity, “a threshold 
of time at which AIs that are at least as smart as humans, and/or augmented human intelligence, 
radically remake civilization” (Miller, 2012, p. x), has become a guiding term under which 
influential entrepreneurs, organizations, and governmental agencies are marshaling substantial 
resources to promote the future of humanity.  Leading technologists Ray Kurzweil and Peter 
Diamandis, and Google CEO Larry Page are just a few of the growing number of 
Singularitarians, people who believe in “the power of technology to shape history” (Grossman, 
2011, p. 3) and the fallibility of “[b]iological boundaries that most people think of as permanent 
and inevitable” (p. 3).  
 This type of discourse, however, which suggests “that out of a fundamentally imperfect 
situation a perfect one may be brought forth, provided the vision of perfection can be made to 
prevail” (Molnar, 1967, p. 5), is not unique to the Singularity.  In fact, much research confirms 
the long tradition of utopian rhetoric in confronting “the sharpest anguish of an age” (Manuel, 
1965, p. 294).  And, as anxiety over rapid technological progress has intensified, technological 
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utopianism, which envisions a future made perfect through technology, has become the 
contemporary manifestation of such discourse (Braine, 1994).  
Through this lens, much of the Singularitarian rhetoric comes into focus.  One example is 
Moravec’s (1988) vision of a future where “Our culture will then be able to evolve 
independently of human biology and its limitations, passing instead directly from generation to 
generation of ever more capable intelligent machinery“ (p. 4).  Another is Vinge’s (1993) 
suggestion that “Immortality (or at least a lifetime as long as we can make the universe survive 
would be achievable)” (p. 19).  Each of these views reflects the optimism inspired by the 
Singularity, which is perhaps best summed up in Miller’s (2012) claim that technology could 
“probably bring us utopia” (p. xvii).  Here, Singularitarian rhetoric mirrors traditional utopian 
discourse, with technology as the cure for all ills.  
Thus, in the remainder of this chapter, I build an argument about the appeal of this type 
of discourse, identifying those elements that cause the Singularitarian perspective to resonate 
with a growing audience.  To accomplish this, I first lay out the characteristics of utopian 
rhetoric, with emphasis on the contemporary, technological utopia.  Then, I apply those 
characteristics to Singularitarian discourse, illuminating the underlying rhetorical patterns that 
build a mythic, utopian vision of the future.  
Utopian Discourse  
 Molnar (1967), commenting on the prevalence of utopia, writes, “The utopian tendency 
in man’s mind is very strong and appears in almost every age” (p. 3).  The continued appearance 
of this type of discourse suggests two things.  First, it speaks to the recurrence of similar 
conditions that would make utopian rhetoric necessary.  Second, it implies that utopian discourse 
can be a powerful means for resolving such conditions; else individuals would likely find an 
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alternative.  In this section, I examine existing scholarship on utopia to determine the types of 
exigencies to which utopian discourse responds and the underlying elements that make up that 
response.  In doing so, I argue that one function of contemporary examples of this discourse is to 
resolve cultural angst regarding science and technology.    
The Rise of Utopian Discourse 
 Utopian discourse tends to thrive in times of social anxiety.  As Molnar (1967) suggests, 
utopian rhetoric often confronts “generally unsettled conditions” (p. 4) and “insecurity and 
suffering” (p. 4).  Here, utopia functions as a cultural dream, envisioning a space cleansed of 
social anxiety (Manuel, 1965).  Generally, such anxiety speaks to the existence of an 
imperfection, or “the very presence of evil in the world [which] constitutes the most general 
incentive for contemplating new systems from which evil would excluded” (Molnar, 1967, p. 4).  
In this vein, Kateb (1965) concludes that the correct definition of utopia is the absence of radical 
evil.  
 The utopian seeks to purge social ills.  The “desire for absolute purity” (Molnar, 1967, p. 
22) and a “society in which radical evil has been abolished and human wants are satisfied to the 
fullest degree possible” (Kateb, 1965, p. 457) serve as the utopian’s main motivations.  Often, 
the manifestations of these dreams are described in terms of leisure and abundance (Molnar, 
1967), suggesting that utopian visions are unencumbered by the material conditions of the 
present.  However, to convince others of both the fallibility and perfectibility of the current 
social order, the utopian rhetor must offer more than an idealized vision of the future.  
The Characteristics of Utopian Discourse 
 Portolano (2012) broadly defines utopian rhetoric as:  
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[t]he use of symbolic communication in an attempt to move the actual state of 
affairs into alignment with an imagined, better state of affairs—that is, a utopia, 
either one shared by the community or one invented by the speaker or both.  (p. 
116)  
To achieve such an ideal state of affairs, effective utopian discourse contains three elements 
(Molnar, 1967).  First, the utopian thinker must identify the conditions (material, ideological, or 
otherwise), which have prevented humans from achieving a state of purity or perfection.  
Second, utopian discourse should illustrate the means of transcending such imperfection.  
Finally, the utopian rhetor must present a vision that satisfies the audience’s needs by resolving 
social anxiety.  
First, utopians need to identify the barriers to perfection.  Here, the utopian seeks to 
characterize the status quo in negative terms, highlighting deficiencies in social, economic, and 
political structures as evidence of unfulfilled individual or communal potential.  For example, by 
indicting class structure as the underlying cause for inequality, the Marxist narrative identifies a 
barrier to individual growth and social harmony.  Similarly, the Christian myth rests on a 
division between Heaven (utopia) and Earth (material reality) that begins with sin and manifests 
in The Fall.  The premise, then, is that human nature is an impediment to transcendence, 
indicating the barrier to be overcome.  And, in indicating the cause of imperfection, the utopian 
implicitly suggests the trajectory of the ideal, desired future.  As Sargent (1994) notes, “If we are 
hungry, we dream of a full stomach.  If we are sexually frustrated, we dream of sexual 
fulfillment.  If we are frustrated by something in our society, we dream of a society in which it is 
corrected” (p. 3).  
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Second, having identified the barriers to an ideal state and broadly defining the vision, the 
utopian must explain the means for transcending such imperfection.  In this element of utopian 
discourse, the rhetor demonstrates to the audience that despite the prevalence of imperfection, all 
hope is not lost.  Instead, by changing their current ideological or material practices, the audience 
might productively confront the problems of the status quo.  Here, the utopian suggests, “we 
have returned to the threshold of a new paradise” (Molnar, 1967, p. 16), and that the means for 
reaching an ideal state are accessible.  As Levitas (2007) notes, “The advantage of utopian 
thinking is that it enables us to think about where we want to go, and how to get there from here” 
(p. 300).  
Finally, the rhetor must gain the audience’s immediate adherence to a trajectory that 
would achieve utopia.  As Molnar (1967) argues, “the utopian is convinced that, once we 
acknowledge the desirability of an ideal state of affairs, we must immediately proceed to bring it 
about” (p. 43).  Of significance, here, is the dual strategy of both justifying the specific trajectory 
and the utopian as leader.  Accepting that society is encumbered by conditions preventing 
perfection and that there are means for overcoming such impediments does not implicitly justify 
the utopian or their solutions.  It merely suggests that certain things should and can change.  
Thus, the rhetor encourages the audience to act swiftly and decisively to avoid entrenching the 
problem.  Here, the utopian’s strategy is to explain how “a single regeneration, putting an end to 
history […] and ushering in a kind of timeless time” (Molnar, 1967, p. 14) could occur.    
For example, adhering to the Marxist vision of utopia implies both accepting that the 
capitalist mode is flawed and rejecting alternatives to Marxism as a corrective.  Similarly, many 
systems of belief identify the fallibility of human nature as a barrier to higher forms of existence, 
but the Christian vision suggests a particular path to transcendence that limits the availability of 
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other ideologies and gods.  The utopian, then, seeks to justify their trajectory towards perfection, 
despite the existence of alternatives, as the necessary path for salvation.  
In summary, utopian discourse relies on three interrelated themes, requiring the rhetor to 
identify the present conditions undermining individual and social harmony, propose the means 
for overcoming such barriers, and characterize their vision as the most likely avenue for success.  
A particular, contemporary iteration of utopian thinking enacts this symbolic form.  
Technological Utopianism 
Braine (1994) notes, the rapid technological innovations that have taken place since the 
1950s have intensified social and cultural ambivalence about science.  Accordingly, many 
visions of a future accounting for technology have been expressly dystopian (Pierce, 1965).  On 
the other hand, utopian thinkers have attempted to resolve uncertainty about scientific invention 
by arguing for technology’s ability to lead society out of such peril.  This strain of discourse, 
known as technological utopianism (or techno-utopianism) suggests that the path to perfection 
has become clearer and more attainable because of science (Molnar, 1967).  
Utopian discourse can be an effective means for overcoming shared cultural or social 
anxieties, providing audiences with a vision of the future rid of (and often made better by) the 
subject of their angst.  However, the success of such discourse relies on the utopian rhetor’s 
ability to convince others of the desirability and possibility of perfection.  As a contemporary 
manifestation of this type of thinking, technological utopianism suggests that technology is the 
cure for many of humanity’s ills, and has elicited both staunch adherence and vocal opposition.  
In the next section, I analyze a particular strain of technological utopianism, the 
Singularity, to identify the underlying rhetorical elements of utopian discourse.  First, I describe 
how Singularitarians discuss barriers to techno-transcendence.  Then, I illuminate the 
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Singularitarian means of transcendence, those strategies available to the audience that can be 
used to achieve utopia.  Finally, I articulate the Singularitarian argument for adherence, 
explaining how these rhetors encourage audiences to consider and embrace their position.  Prior 
to that three-part analysis, I describe the Singularitarian utopia.  
The Singularity as a Techno-Utopia 
Advocates of the Singularity articulate a utopian vision of the future.  For example, 
Kurzweil (2005) suggests that, “The Singularity will allow us to transcend [the] limitations of 
our biological bodies and brains.  We will gain power over our fates.  Our mortality will be in 
our own hands.  We will be able to live as long as we want” (p. 9).  Tiku (2012) explains some of 
the means by which technological progress could achieve such utopian ends, writing, “If we are 
able to develop a ‘friendly’ superhuman intelligence, then it could do everything from curing 
cancer to accelerating scientific research to eradicating hunger” (para 16).  And Vinge (1993), 
emphasizing the potential abundance offered by technology and typical of utopian discourse, 
notes,  
Suppose we could tailor the Singularity.  Suppose we could attain our most 
extravagant hopes.  What then would we ask for: That humans themselves would 
become their own successors, that whatever injustice occurs would be tempered 
by our knowledge of our roots.  For those who remained unaltered [by 
technological enhancement], the goal would be benign treatment (perhaps even 
giving the stay-behinds the appearance of being masters of godlike slaves).  It 
could be a golden age that also involved progress. (p. 19) 
Singularitarian rhetoric, then, offers a vision of techno-utopia: a world of limitless possibilities, 
material abundance, and near immortality through technological progress.  And, for many of 
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these rhetors, the first element in getting audiences to embrace this trajectory is to effectively 
describe the obstacles to transcendence in the present system.  
Barriers to the Singularity 
 Singularitarians’ offer a number of timelines for the threshold of ultra-intelligence.  
Miller (2012) notes these discrepant trajectories, observing that Singularitarians variously 
identify 2025, 2030, 2045, or 2080 as possible dates for the event.  Chalmers (2010) notes that 
such variety speaks to the history of predictions regarding artificial intelligence, writing, “The 
history of AI involves a long series of optimistic predictions by those who pioneer a method, 
followed by periods of disappointment and reassessment” (p. 11).  Such variety in these forecasts 
might be accounted for by the vast array of possible obstructions on the path to techno-
transcendence.  In this section, I illuminate the substance of these barriers.  I then turn to the 
discourse of Singularitarians to illuminate how such barriers are overcome to craft the 
foundations of their techno-utopian narrative.  
Material Barriers 
 Much research suggests that achieving the Singularity is primarily constrained by 
material issues. A survey of relevant literature illuminates two types of barriers, including 
deficiencies in the current state of technology and the limits of human intelligence. 
 The current state of technology. A primary explanation for the variance in estimated 
dates for the Singularity is the current state of research on the brain.  Specifically, much of the 
Singularitarian trajectory relies on groundbreaking advances in the means by which machines 
process information.  For example, modern computers hold at least two distinct advantages over 
the human brain.  First, they can store a significantly larger amount of data.  Second, they can 
resolve data-based queries (equations, key-word searches, etc.) at a much more rapid rate.  
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However, machines still lack a system for the types of information-association techniques 
endemic to the mind.  As Saenz (2010a) laments, scientists continue to struggle with the 
complexities of the human brain, undermining attempts to model the mind and, subsequently, 
engineer machines capable of employing its processes.  Chalmers (2010) similarly describes this 
problem, arguing, “the most important remaining form of resistance [to the Singularity] is the 
claim that the brain is not a mechanical system at all, or at least that the nonmechanical [sic] 
processes play a role in its functioning that cannot be emulated” (p. 9).  A significant barrier, 
then, to ultra-intelligent technology is the contemporary understanding of the brain.  
  A second constraint on the feasibility of the Singularity is the current, limited processing 
capacity of computers.  In fact, much research concludes that even if scientists were to reverse-
engineer the brain and create a working model, the required processing power for such a machine 
is likely impossible. As Wolchover (2012) notes, “some scientists say that computing power is 
approaching its zenith” (para 12), making future extrapolations for Singularity-level processing 
capabilities seem improbable.  Paul (2013) confirms this assessment, writing, “Chips may be 
getting smaller, but huge gains in processing power aren’t making the same jumps over that time 
we saw in previous decades” (para 8).  These comments reflect a growing sentiment in scientific 
and technological communities that Moore’s Law, the principle that suggests the “doubling of 
computing power every two years” (Wolchover, 2012, para 6) is reaching its limit.  In that event, 
engineers and manufacturers will be forced to find alternative means of generating processing 
power, few of which currently exist.  
 Thus, material barriers seem to deny the possibility of the Singularity.  Both the inability 
to produce mind-like processes in machines and the lack of hardware capable of implementing 
such processes interrupt the techno-transcendence trajectory.  A separate strain of discourse 
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emphasizes the feasibility of the Singularity, but contends that the primary obstacle to achieving 
it is the limit of human intelligence.  
 The limits of human intelligence. A major barrier to ultra-intelligence is the current, 
limited capability of scientists, technologists, and engineers to create the programs necessary for 
its manifestation.  Anissimov (2010) describes this as the “Microsoft Windows objection” (para 
3) to the Singularity, noting that, “operating systems are plagued by a huge number of 
programmers without any coherent theory that they can really agree on” (para 4).  Similarly, 
Chalmers (2010) notes, “the biggest bottleneck on the path to AI is software, not hardware: we 
have to find the right algorithms, and no-one has come close to finding them yet” (p. 6).  Here, 
techno-transcendence is jeopardized by incoherence in relevant fields and a general inability to 
perfect the necessary software.  
 Miller (2012) identifies a, perhaps, more fundamental issue regarding the limits of human 
intelligence: the scarcity of groundbreaking genius.  Using famed scientist John von Neumann as 
a litmus test, he concludes, “minds like his probably don’t come about more than once in every 
billion or so natural births” (p. 95).  For Miller, the lack of von Neumann- and Einstein-level 
intellects, paradigm-shifting scientists who altered the future of various disciplines, makes it 
difficult to both generate ultra-intelligent machines and to articulate their trajectories. 
 Therefore, while human intelligence serves as the foundation for the Singularity, its 
contemporary, limited state acts as a barrier.  Deficiencies in computer programs and the lack of 
genius reduce the likelihood of achieving the Singularity in the near term.  Yet, for 
Singularitarians, these substantive concerns serve as opportunities to achieve transcendence, 
looking past the material conditions of the present in favor of a perfected vision of the future.  
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Thus, in the next section, I illuminate the ways that Singularitarians rhetorically construct such 
barriers as the foundation of their utopian narrative.  
Barriers as Blindness 
 A cornerstone of utopian discourse is the characterization of barriers as both significant 
enough to have obstructed transcendence in the past but also manageable enough to allow 
perfection in the future.  For Singularitarians this is particularly difficult.  First, they must 
acknowledge the contemporary limits on science and technology as potential limits on their 
vision.  For example, Kurzweil (2005) notes, “from our currently limited framework, this 
imminent event appears to be an acute and abrupt break in the continuity of progress” (p. 24).  
The implication is two-fold: the history of science and technology does not suggest the type of 
advancement necessary for techno-transcendence nor does the contemporary state of such fields 
allow it.  
 Singularitarian discourse then relies on characterizing such barriers as indictments of 
contemporary perspectives on science and technology, justifying a Singularitarian view of 
reality.  For example, also implicit in Kurzweil’s remarks is that such a limited capacity is only 
current and does not reflect the tools and technology of the future.  He continues, “I emphasize 
the word ‘currently’ because one of the salient implications of the Singularity will be a change in 
the nature of our ability to understand” (p. 24).  For Singularitarians, then, the material limits of 
the present are not the barriers to utopia; they are instead evidence for and reflective of the real 
obstruction: scientific pessimism.  As Kurzweil (2005) writes,  
Many scientists and engineers have what I call “scientist’s pessimism.” Often, 
they are so immersed in the difficulties and intricate details of a contemporary 
challenge that they fail to appreciate the ultimate long-term implications of their 
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own work, and the larger field of work in which they operate.  They likewise fail 
to account for the far more powerful tools they will have available with each new 
generation of technology.  (p. 12)  
A similar sentiment appears in Moravec’s (1988) seminal work on ultra-intelligence.  He 
contends, “We are at the start of something quite new in the scheme of things.  Until now we 
have been shaped by the invisible hand of Darwinian evolution, a powerful process that learns 
from the past but is blind to the future” (p. 158).  Again, the emphasis on a lack of vision 
suggests that the real barrier to scientific and technological progress is a limited gaze.  And, in a 
related vein, Vinge (1993) argues that the contemporary means for assessing and describing 
science and technology cannot account for the types of changes implicit in the transition to the 
Singularity.  
Thus, for Singularitarians, the primary barrier to techno-utopia is the limited perspective 
in the fields necessary for its manifestation.  That there are scientists, technologists, and 
engineers who would challenge the trajectory of the Singularity merely reflects a narrow view of 
the potentialities of progress.  As such, an alternative vision is warranted, one that sees the 
material constraints of the present and looks beyond them for strategies to achieve perfection.  In 
the next section, I illuminate the rhetorical strategies that Singulitarians use to convince 
audiences that the means for transcendence exist.  
The Means of Transcendence  
 Proponents of the Singularity confront the limits of science and technology by employing 
two interrelated rhetorical strategies for achieving techno-transcendence.  First, Singularitarians 
argue that audiences should widen their gaze, seeing the present as part of a longer, evolutionary 
timeline that illustrates the likelihood of their vision.  Second, Singularitarians point to 
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contemporary examples of scientific and technological progress as evidence of the foundations 
for the Singularity. 
The Singularity as Evolution 
  The first strategy for illuminating the available means of transcendence is to characterize 
the Singularity as part of the evolutionary process of humanity.  As Kurzweil (1989) notes, 
“Evolution created human intelligence. Now human intelligence is designing intelligent 
machines at a far faster pace. Yet another example will be when our intelligent technology takes 
control of the creation of yet more intelligent technology than itself” (p. 47).  Yet, implicit in this 
characterization of technological progress as evolutionary is an underlying notion of time.  
In particular, the current state of science and technology might seem like too substantial a 
barrier to ultra-intelligent machines.  However, this treatment of progress (and by implication, 
time) is fixed, even linear, seeing the possibility of tomorrow as dictated by the capabilities of 
today.  Singularitarians attempt to change this perspective by constructing linearity as the 
exception rather than the rule.  As Kurzweil (1999) contends, “Time only seems to be linear 
during those eons in which not much happens.  Thus most of the time, the linear passage of time 
is a reasonable approximation of its passage.  But that’s not the inherent nature of time” (p. 10).  
This characterization of time diminishes the significance of any single, temporal moment by 
expanding the scope of the reference to consider the larger narrative of evolution. 
 The rhetorical function of evolutionary discourse.  Discourses of evolution appear 
throughout much Singularitarain rhetoric.  For example, Kurzweil (2005) notes, “The Singularity 
denotes an event that will take place in the material world, the inevitable next step in the 
evolutionary process that started with biological evolution and has extended through human-
directed technological evolution” (p. 387).  Vinge (1993) contends,  
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The best analogy I see is with the evolutionary past: Animals can adapt to 
problems and make inventions, but often no faster than natural selection can do its 
work – the world acts as its own simulator in the case of natural selection.  (p. 12)  
Moravec (1988), describes the Singularity as the culmination of a “process [that] began about 
100 million years ago, when certain gene lines hit upon a way to make animals with the ability to 
learn some behaviors from their elders during life, rather than inheriting them all at conception” 
(p. 2).  Additionally, Miller (2012) suggests that “the blind forces of evolution” (p. 202) gave rise 
to memory and learning as tools, an indication that such a force will also make possible the 
conditions for ultra-intelligent machines.  This strategy of weaving the discourse of evolution 
into the Singularitarian narrative alters the audience’s perception of time, and encourages them to 
see the transition to techno-transcendence as a natural process.  
 Altering the audience’s experience with time.  Characterizing the Singularity as the next 
step in the evolution of humanity imbues the process with a dynamic sense of time.  Frentz 
(1985) offers a useful assessment on the rhetorical construction of temporality, describing two 
ways in which humans can experience time: the encounter level and the form of life level.  He 
writes, “When we experience time on the encounter level, it is the quantitative cumulation of 
temporal units—seconds, minutes, hours, days.  Ontically real, encounter time is the stuff that 
ages us, makes cars rust, and codifies nicely into maxim” (p. 7).  Here, “our temporal connection 
to past and future is limited to the spatio-temporal boundaries of the encounter context in which 
the episode occurs” (p. 7).  And, lacking a larger narrative into which individual, temporal 
experience can be sutured, everyday actions appear devoid of a trajectory towards transcendence 
or unity (Rushing, 1986).  
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 Alternatively, and in distinction to an experience with time as a singular moment, isolated 
from context, individuals sometimes  
experience the temporal holism of a form of life all at once, in the consciousness 
of the present in an on-going conversation, they place themselves in a narrative 
context in which past and potential conversations are experienced as an historical 
unity emerging in the present—a unity whose evolving direction can be 
determined in part through cooperative action.  (Frentz, 1985, p. 7)  
In this type of temporal experience, individuals understand the material present as part of a 
trajectory in which they actively participate with others in “crescendo, catharsis, and denouement 
by probing the surface of linear time to discover the implicit plot which leads toward or away 
from humanity’s telos” (Rushing, 1986, p. 268).  The result is that individuals see themselves as 
“actors in a dramatic story” (Frentz, 1985, p. 7), imbuing their actions with meaning beyond their 
actual experience.  
 Much Singularitarian discourse attempts to move audiences from experiencing time at the 
encounter level to seeing time at the form of life level.  Kurzweil (1989), for instance, challenges 
the concept of linearity.  He writes,  
Events moved quickly at the beginning of the Universe’s history.  We had three 
paradigm shifts in just the first billionth of a second.  Later on, events of 
cosmological significance took billions of years.  The nature of time is that it 
inherently moves in exponential fashion—either geometrically gaining in speed, 
or, as in the history of the Universe, geometrically slowing down.  (p. 10)  
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By placing the audience’s momentous, individualized encounters with time against a cosmic 
backdrop, Kurzweil implies that their experience lacks context, missing the true movement of the 
Universe.   
Kurzweil codifies this treatment of time by naming it, “The Law of Accelerating 
Returns,” (1989, p. 30), and formally defining it as a principle feature of history in which 
evolution exponentially speeds up because “it builds on its own increasing order.  Innovations 
created by evolution encourage and enable faster evolution” (p. 32).  Zorpette (2008) articulates 
this internal logic, noting that the creation of even a single ultra-intelligent machine will  
trigger a series of cycles in which superintelligent machines beget even smarter 
machine progeny, going from generation to generation in weeks or days rather 
than decades or years.  The availability of all that cheap, mass-produced brilliance 
will spark explosive economic growth, an unending, hypersonic, technoindustrial 
rampage that by comparison will make the Industrial Revolution look like a bingo 
game.  (para 3) 
Much Singularitarian discourse attempts to illustrate this principle as it applies to technology. 
Moravec (1999) notes that “from 1940 to 1980 the amount of computation available at a 
given cost increased a millionfold” (p. 57).  Kurzweil (2005) reminds the audience that 
widespread adoption of the telephone through the late 1800s and early 1900s took nearly a half-
century, while use of the cell phone reached diffusion in a decade.  Similarly, Miller (2012) 
laments,  
If I told you that computers had to be a million times faster before we could create 
a human-level AI, then your intuitive reaction might be that it won’t happen for 
centuries.  However, if Moore’s Law continues to hold, then in twenty years you 
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will be able to buy one million times as much computing power per dollar as you 
can today.  (p. 4)  
The purpose of these arguments is to illuminate to the audience that they are living in a period of 
rapid progress.  These examples also provide the audience with a reason not to see the present as 
a necessary limit on the future.  While the current state of science and technology denies the 
possibility of the Singularity, an approach to time through the lens of evolution undermines the 
significance of the present.  A primary discursive strategy of Singularitarians, then, is to 
encourage the audience to see time as narrative form, rather than as individual experiences.  
 An additional result of this strategy is that it establishes a particular type of relationship 
between humans and technology.  Specifically, by describing humans as the necessary means for 
creation, Singularitarian discourse emphasizes a metaphor of parentage, marking the event as the 
natural succession of life.   
The Singularity as natural.  The second significant effect of characterizing the 
Singularity as the next evolutionary step is that it makes the transition to ultra-intelligence seem 
natural.  This strategy is apparent in Vinge’s (1998) suggestion that “there are a couple of trends 
that at least raise the possibility of the technological singularity.  The first is a very long-term 
trend, namely Life’s tendency, across aeons, toward greater complexity.  Some people see this as 
unstoppable progress toward betterment” (para 9).  Here, “life,” which is constantly evolving, 
becomes the common discourse through which potential audience members can understand 
technological progress as one of the many likely (and inevitably occurring) instances of 
evolution.  
This type of rhetoric is, perhaps, most apparent in Moravec’s (1989) metaphor of 
parentage.  He writes,  
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What awaits is not oblivion but rather a future which, from our present vantage 
point, is best described by the words “postbiological” or even “supernatural.”  It is 
a world in which the human race has been swept away by the tide of cultural 
change, usurped by its own artificial progeny.  (p. 1) 
The parent-child metaphor frames a Singular world in natural terms, with humans creating and 
cultivating the development of their children.  Of significance here is the emphasis on process 
rather than product.  In situating ultra-intelligent machines as humanity’s progeny, Moravec 
draws attention to the intimate relationship between humans and technology by emphasizing the 
transition from one to the other as a natural process (as parents birth their children).  This 
characterization confronts a particular social anxiety regarding ultra-intelligent machines: 
Thoughtful machinery violates the equally obvious and sacred dichotomy of the 
living and the dead, a difference embedded in our mentality.  The skills for 
interacting with living things, with feelings, memories, and intentions, are utterly 
different from the techniques for shaping insensitive dead matter.  (Moravec, 1999, 
p. 111)  
Yet, the metaphor of parentage imbues the otherwise lifeless machines with a human essence.  
Moravec explains, “it is likely that we, the historical root of their transcendence, will be 
preserved in some form” (p. 11).  Thus, describing the transition to the Singularity as the 
movement from parent to child assuages concerns regarding alien-ness of technology.    
 In sum, Singularitarian rhetors construct their vision as the next step in human evolution.  
This strategy suggests that the audience should approach the Singularity with a fluid perspective 
towards time, paying attention to the form of evolution rather than their particular temporal 
experiences.  In doing so, Singularitarians undermine challenges to their vision that identify the 
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current state of science and technology as a limit on progress.  This strategy also implies that the 
transition to a Singular world is natural, an inevitable and organic process.  Here, understood as 
progeny, technology becomes an extension of rather than threat to humanity’s essence.  These 
two interrelated strains of discourse serve as resources for the audience, providing them with the 
symbolic means to believe that the material and ideological barriers to the Singularity will be 
overcome.  
In the next section, I detail that the second significant rhetorical strategy, the 
identification of contemporary examples of science and technology that illustrate the shift 
towards the Singularity.  
Contemporary Indicators of the Singularity  
 Moravec (1999) recalls the storied matches between chess Grandmaster Garry Kasparov 
and IBM’s Deep Blue.  After recounting the specifics of each game, Moravec notes, “Several 
times during both matches, Kasparov reported signs of mind in the machine. In the second 
tournament, he worried there might be humans behind the scenes, feeding Deep Blue strategic 
insights” (p. 67)!  Moravec’s account speaks to a growing belief by many experts that signs of 
the Singularity are ever-present in increasingly intelligent machines.  And, Kasparov’s concern 
regarding something beyond the circuitry is only one of the many examples pointing towards 
ultra-intelligence.  Vinge (2008), for instance, observes that, “Once upon a time, there was a 
continent of human-only tasks. By the end of the 1900s, that continent had become an 
archipelago” (para 18).  These arguments contribute to an emerging strain of discourse, which 
contends that the foundations for the Singularity exist.  This perspective is perhaps best 
articulated in Brooks’ (2008) claim that, “Starting with the mildly intelligent systems we have 
today, machines will become gradually more intelligent, generation by generation” (para 7).  
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 This element of Singularitarian rhetoric serves two functions.  First, both the prevalence 
and intelligence of technology indicates the possibility of Singularity-like progress despite 
contemporary limits on scientific and technological research.  Second, Singularitarians construct 
these examples as evidence for their future projections.  In the following section, I illuminate this 
rhetorical strategy by first identifying the keystone exemplars Singularitarians use for their 
argument, and then expanding on the dual functions of such discourse.  
 Examples as evidence.  Singularitarians point to a variety of scientific and technological 
endeavors that highlight the types of innovations making the Singularity more likely.  These 
examples tend to fall in one of two categories: increased interactions between technology and the 
human body, and advances in artificial intelligence and nanotechnology.  
 Technology and the human body (Biotechnology).  In order to confront a litany of 
biological threats to life, humans are finding an increasing number of ways to enhance their 
bodies through technology.  As Brooks (2008) argues, “We, human beings, are already starting 
to change ourselves from purely biological entities into mixtures of biology and technology” 
(para 34).  Miller (2012) describes this process, identified by many (Kurzweil, 1999; Kurzweil, 
2005; Brooks, 2008) as perhaps the integral step in the transition to posthumanity, as a 
“Kurzweilian merger” (p. 7), borrowing from Kurzweil’s heavy-handed emphasis on symbiotic 
partnerships between humans and machines.  And, evidence of this merger is abundant.  
 In particular, experts point to the increased use and proficiency of prostheses.  For 
example, Vinge (2008) contends that the development of neural prostheses, which “has mainly 
involved hearing, vision, and communication” (para 21) are “the sorts of things we should track 
going forward, as signs of progress toward the singularity” (para 21).  At the core of this 
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discussion are advances in brain-machine interfaces, such as cochlear and ocular implants.  As 
Brooks notes,  
More than 50,000 people have tiny computers surgically implanted in their heads 
with direct neural connections to their cochleas to enable them to hear.  In the 
testing stage, there are retina microchips to restore vision and motor implants to 
give quadriplegics the ability to control computers with thought.  (para 35) 
Of significance in these developments is not just their ability to enhance the lives of their users, 
but also the insights they give into further integrating technology into the brain.  
Kurzweil (2005), for instance, describes a significant barrier to current attempts at brain-
machine interfacing, noting that, “A key challenge in connecting neural implants to biological 
neurons is that the neurons generate glial cells, which surround a ‘foreign’ object in an attempt to 
protect the brain” (p. 195).  However, in recent research on both cochlear and deep-brain 
implants (used for Parkinson’s patients), scientists are discovering new ways to encourage the 
brain to embrace technological enhancements.  And, a variety of organizations and institutions, 
including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, are spending millions of dollars to 
use this technology in a variety of new ways (Kurzweil, 2005).  
In addition to advances in neural prostheses, Singularitarians also point to the increased 
use of technology throughout the rest of the body.  Brooks (2008) observes, “We replace hips 
and other parts of our bodies with titanium and steel parts” (para 35) and that “Robotic prosthetic 
legs, arms, and hands are becoming more sophisticated” (para 35).  Similarly, Kurzweil (2005) 
details biotechnology and genome research on genes and cells (and the diseases transmitted 
through them).  He writes, “Many new therapies now in development and testing are based on 
	   53 
manipulating them [genes] either to turn off the expression of disease-causing genes or to turn on 
desirable genes that may otherwise not be expressed in a particular cell type” (p. 213).  
Moreover, Kurzweil suggests that the type of research described above will likely 
contribute to “reengineered bodies” (p. 305).  For example, he contends that current methods for 
replacing body parts (prostheses) have led to an increased understanding of the skeleton, but are 
limited in their capacity.  Thus, building on this knowledge, scientists can pioneer the “human 
skeleton 2.0” (p. 307), consisting of interlinking nanobots that will be strong and self-repairing.  
Yet, bones are not the only replaceable parts of the body.  He continues, “Although artificial 
hearts are beginning to be feasible replacements, a more effective approach will be to get rid of 
the heart altogether” (p. 306).  And, based on emerging models in nanotechnology, humans will 
develop “programmable blood” (p. 305), capable of downloading “software to destroy specific 
infections hundreds of times faster than antibiotics” (p. 306).  
Each of these examples serves an important function in Singularitarian rhetoric.  
Specifically, they provide audience members with evidence for the types of innovations that 
might act as foundations for the Singularity, possibilities for achieving techno-utopia.  And, in 
emphasizing the use of technology to enhance (or remedy) the body, Singularitarians present a 
vision in benevolent terms, intimately tying technological progress to important values (i.e. 
health, quality of life).  The audience, then, should see in the Singularity the potential for 
salvation.  A separate but related strain of Singularitarian discourse emphasizes significant (and 
historical) trends towards techno-transcendence: artificial intelligence.  
Advances in artificial intelligence.  Underlying a vision of the universe enhanced by 
ultra-intelligence are emerging trends in artificial intelligence.  As Kurzweil (1999) notes, this 
field has been energized by an “intense and often uncritical passion” (p. 70) since a suggestion 
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by Alan Turing (widely regarded as a pillar of artificial intelligence) in the middle of the 20th 
century that a machine might eventually interact with (and as) a human.  Since then, “Our many 
species of machine intelligence have woven themselves so seamlessly into our modern rain 
forest [a metaphor for everyday environment] that they are all but invisible” (p. 71).  Recent 
advances in artificial intelligence include the development of machines adept in natural language 
and the proliferation of robots.  
 These developments are foundational elements in Singularitarian rhetoric.  For example, 
Miller (2012) describes one possible path to the Singularity as an “intelligence explosion” (p. 
13), where “a single AI might go from being human-level intelligent to being something closer to 
a god, what I call an ultra-AI, in a period of weeks, days, or even hours” (p. 13).  Similar 
accounts appear throughout Singularitarian texts (including Kurzweil, 1999; Kurzweil, 2005; 
Moravec, 1999), and each suggests the possibility of the first intelligent machine as the precursor 
to “an exponential runaway” (Vinge, 1993, p. 12) of artificial intelligence.  These musings are an 
integral part of a rhetorical strategy that asks audiences to re-interpret their encounters with time.  
By constructing a scenario in which one achievement can discard contemporary rules governing 
scientific and technological progress (and, seemingly, the amount of time it would take for such 
progress), Singularitarians tie the present (current efforts towards artificial intelligence) to their 
vision of the future. 
 A supplement to this strategy is to remind audiences that forces beyond their control will 
likely ensure the development of such a machine.  Hanson (2008), for instance, argues that the 
economic benefits of ultra-intelligence will continue to drive research.  He notes that both the 
speed with which intelligent computers could learn and the minimal cost it would take to 
produce and maintain such a workforce are factors contributing to private efforts towards 
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artificial intelligence.  Miller (2012) confirms this assessment, reminding the audience that while 
farmers now account for less than 2% of the American workforce (down from 38% in 1900), 
America produces more food each year because of significant developments in agricultural 
technology.  
 Additional influence for these types of projects comes from the United States Military, 
which has been on the cutting edge of artificial intelligence.  Kurzweil contends, “We saw the 
first effective example of the increasingly dominant role of machine intelligence in the Gulf War 
of 1991” (1999, p. 71).  During this conflict, “intelligent scanning by unstaffed airborne 
vehicles” (p. 71) and “weapons finding their way to their destinations through machine vision 
and pattern recognition” (p. 71) replaced the “cornerstones of military power” (p. 71), including 
geography, firepower, and troops.  Similarly, both the 2002 military campaign in Afghanistan 
and the 2003 war in Iraq saw the debut and diffusion of the “armed Predator” (2005, p. 280), 
which destroyed “thousands of enemy tanks and missile sites” (p. 280).  Currently, DARPA is 
refining (rather publically, nonetheless) two robotics efforts that would supplement the use of 
human troops in the battlefield, setting the stage for a potentially “completely robotic army” 
(Anthony, 2013, para 5).       
Much as evolutionary discourse is used to make the audience feel as if the transition to 
the Singularity is natural, these examples rely on historical (arguably positive) trends as evidence 
for the necessity of continued evolution through artificial intelligence.  If the audience can begin 
to see their reality as a product of significant but subtle shifts towards technological ubiquity, 
perhaps they might also see the value of efforts in that vein as well as the potential benefits of a 
Singular world.  And, a final strain of discourse emphasizes the benevolence of these types of 
progress.  
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Nanotechnology.  The third category relates to nanotechnology.  Kurzweil (2005) notes, 
“Nanotechnology promises the tools to rebuild the physical world—our bodies and brains 
included—molecular fragment by molecular fragment, potentially atom by atom” (p. 226).  In 
particular, Singularitarians identify nanotechnology as both the means of achieving techno-
transcendence and the building blocks for existing in a Singular world.  Miller (2012) contends 
that nanotechnology is “the key enabler of a Kurzweilian merger: that is what we would use to 
construct and regulate the nonbiological part of ourselves” (p. 8).  Kurzweil (2005) explains 
more thoroughly how nanotechnology might achieve the Singularity, suggesting, “rapid progress 
has been made, particularly in the last several years, in preparing the conceptual framework and 
design ideas” (p. 228) involving nanotechnology that will in turn carry on the Law of 
Accelerating Returns.  
Specifically, nanotechnology will have two significant, interdependent effects on 
Singularitarian-style progress.  First, in shrinking the relevant elements of computers (i.e. 
transistors, chips), nanotechnology will necessarily increase the computational efficiency and 
power of a given machines.  For example, the first working model of a single-atom transistor, 
developed and tested in 2012 (Tally, 2012), signals the most likely scenario for advances in 
quantum computing, a requirement for ultra-intelligent machines (Kurzweil, 2005).  Second, and 
as a result of increasingly efficient and intelligent machines, nanotechnology will diminish 
energy consumption across a variety of industries while also streamlining current methods of 
extraction and refinement (Kurzweil, 2005).  The resulting economic incentive for major 
corporations and organizations to cut costs and increase yields by developing efficient 
technology will likely drive such developments (Miller, 2012).  As such progress builds on itself, 
with each advance producing more intelligent means of achieving a variety of goals, “physical 
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technologies, such as manufacturing and energy, will become governed by the law of 
accelerating returns.  All technologies will essentially become information technologies” 
(Kurzweil, 2005, p. 243).  
Additionally, advances in nanotechnology will drive research and development in both 
biotechnology and artificial intelligence.  For instance, the use of nanobots to diagnose ailments 
and deliver the appropriate remedies by moving through the bloodstream can revolutionize 
internal medicine (Kurzweil, 2005).  Similarly, nanotubes, tiny cylinders of carbon atoms, will 
make possible smaller and faster transistors, which will be key to ultra-intelligent machines 
(Kurzweil, 2005).  Given the current state of such research, the economic demand from key 
industries, and the Law of Accelerating Returns, Kurzweil believes that the kinds of 
nanotechnology necessary for the Singularity will likely be developed by 2025 (2005; Miller, 
2012). 
A primary element of utopian Singulartiarian discourse is to identify contemporary 
examples of progress as evidence for the possibility of their vision.  Specifically, these rhetors 
point to advances in biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology as three 
interrelated fields paving the way for techno-utopia, and suggest that such changes are (and have 
been historically) valuable.  The audience, then, should look upon the current state of science and 
technology as the benevolent seeds of a techno-revolution to come, rather than as a practical 
limit to transcendence.  Yet, pointing to contemporary indicators of the Singularity serves an 
additional noteworthy function: to establish the credibility of the vision of a utopian future.     
 Examples as credibility.  Much Singularitarian discourse emphasizes current trends in 
science and technology so that audiences might see the proverbial dots connecting the present to 
the techno-utopian future.  However, in between “now” and “then” is a murky space where, even 
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by Singularitarian accounts, progress will explode in seemingly unpredictable ways.  Thus, for 
audience members willing to accept that contemporary technologies are sufficient benchmarks 
on the path to the Singularity, they must also accept that there is merit in Singularitarian 
predictions of the unpredictable.  Or, put another way, these rhetors must both justify their 
projections, while also justifying their credibility to predict the future. 
 O’Leary (1997) discusses this as an issue of authority, noting that arguers making 
predictive claims often rely on their expertise/experience regarding the subject-matter as 
evidence for their ability to forecast.  In particular, predictive claims based in technical discourse 
(i.e. scientific or technological issues), “function as tests of theory and hence are subject to more 
rigorous standards of proof” (p. 311).  This type of discourse “operates rhetorically by linking 
the ‘rational’ with the ‘oracular’ voice” (O’Leary, 1994, p. 13).   
 As the “most well known advocate of the Singularity” (Esget, 2014, para 1), Kurzweil’s 
discourse is dependent on his credibility.  As one author notes, he “is both famous and infamous 
for his technological predictions” (The technological citizen, 2010, para 5), having accurately 
predicted a number of technological events.  For example, In The Age of Spiritual Machines 
(1999), Kurzweil claims to have made 108 predictions regarding technology (Saenz, 2010b), 
each set to resolve in a given decade (i.e. 2009-2019).  These include the prevalence of speech-
to-text conversion software, the abundance of airborne drones in combat, and the development of 
three-dimensional computer chips (Kurzweil, 1999).  Kurzweil claims that of his 108 
predictions, 102 were “essentially correct” (Saenz, 2010b, para 1). Kurzweil, then, should appear 
to the audience as a credible source for predicting changes in technology.  And, given his 
previous success with relevant projections, the audience should feel comfortable accepting 
Kurzweil’s expertise for material proof.  
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 Of interest, though, is not merely Kurzweil’s success, but also his reason for making 
predictions about technology in the first place.  He writes,  
there are at least apparent similarities between anticipation of the Singularity and 
anticipation of the transformations articulated by traditional religions.  But I did 
not come to my perspective as a result of searching for an alternative to customary 
faith.  The origin of my quest to understand technology trends was practical: an 
attempt to time my inventions and to make optimal tactical decisions in launching 
technology enterprises.  (2005, p. 370)  
This passage is significant to Singularitarian rhetoric for two reasons.  First, it eschews religious 
discourse as a primary means of sense making, instead suggesting that the Singularity is best 
understood through technical, rational terms.  The Singularity, for Kurzweil, “is not a matter of 
faith but one of understanding, pondering the scientific trends” (p. 370).  Those willing to accept 
the vision are enlightened, having seen the true curve of progress beyond the material present. 
 Second, this passage encourages the audience to see Kurzweil in a particular role.  As he 
makes clear, his predictions are not those of a prophet, who requires a “direct experience of 
divinity” (O’Leary, 1997, p. 296).  Rather, Kurzweil is merely a smart investor who “started 
pondering the relationship of our thinking to our computational technology as a teenager in the 
1960s” (p. 370).  Kurzweil is an observer, a social scientist, even an historian, who has taken 
everyday information and identified underlying, important patterns.  Thus, embracing the 
Singularity does not require the audience to believe in some higher power.  His methods are 
based in rationalistic discourse, and his previous successes predicting technological change 
confirms that the Singularitarian projection is likely.   
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  In sum, Singularitarian rhetors employ two strategies for illuminating to audiences the 
available means of transcendence.  First, Singularitarians construct their vision as part of the 
larger evolutionary trajectory of humanity.  Second, Singularitarians identify current 
technologies as the foundations for techno-transcendence.  Ironically, in embracing such a 
rationalistic persona, Kurzweil acts as a prophet for techno-reason as an alternative to traditional 
religion.  In this way, science becomes his house of worship and progress his technological 
heaven. 
In the next section, I illuminate the last element of utopic-Singularitarian discourse.  
Having identified the barriers to transcendence and illustrating the means for overcoming such 
obstacles, Singularitarians must justify why audiences should adopt their perspective as the 
preferable means for making sense of their lives.  
The Singularitarian Justification for Adherence 
 Singularitarians face a common rhetorical problem in myth systems: justifying the belief 
in something transcendent.  While much has been written on the potentially positive outcomes of 
ultra-intelligent machines, the guarantee of such a scenario is, admittedly, up in the air.  As 
Kurzweil (2005) notes, “we cannot look past its [the Singularity’s] event horizon and make 
complete sense of what lies beyond” (p. 29).  Such a sentiment implies that for every benevolent 
technological advance there exists the risk of its dangerous counterpart, as “technology 
empowers both our creative and destructive natures” (Kurzweil, 2005, p. 396).  Accordingly, 
much Singularitarian discourse focused on steps to produce adherence to such a trajectory, 
emphasizes a positive outcome.  In the following section, I illustrate this final element of techno-
utopian rhetoric in two sections.  First, I highlight examples of risk-based discourse, which 
Singularitarians use to justify the audience’s adherence to their vision.  Then, I identify the types 
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of solutions that these rhetors recommend, including the political and social means for producing 
a beneficial Singularity.  
Risk-based Discourse 
 The Singularitarian argument for adherence begins with an assessment of risk, combining 
two interrelated strains of discourse.  First, Singularitarians construct the mere possibility of their 
vision as reason enough to embrace it.  In so doing, they must account for the risks associated 
with the Singularity. In this effort, these rhetors suggest that the potential for risk, which they 
contend is endemic to all technological progress, warrants careful public consideration.  
Kurzweil, for instance, (2005) writes, 
People often go through three stages in considering the impact of future 
technology: awe and wonderment at its potential to overcome age-old problems; 
then a sense of dread at a new set of grave dangers that accompany these novel 
technologies; followed finally by the realization that the only viable and 
responsible path is to set a careful course that can realize the benefits while 
managing the dangers.  (p. 408)  
Here, developing frameworks for controlling possible dangers becomes a focus.  This framing 
encourages the audience to encounter the Singularity as they encounter all technological 
progress, allowing them to make sense of the event through personal experience, subtly 
emphasizing the ubiquity of technological change.  
Singularitarians, then, encourage the audience to treat the Singularity as a specific 
example of their larger experiences with technology adoption, emphasizing the risks as a reason 
for their attention.  Chalmers (2010), for example, claims, “if there is even a small chance that 
there will be a singularity, we would do well to think about what form it might take and whether 
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there is anything we can do to influence the outcomes in a positive direction” (p. 4).  He 
continues, “These are life-or-death questions that may confront us in coming decades or 
centuries.  To have any hope of answering them, we need to think clearly about the philosophical 
issues” (p. 4).  A similar, risk-based assessment appears in Miller’s (2012) work, where he 
articulates the value of preparatory actions, “if you believe a friendly Singularity might be near” 
(p. 179).  
These arguments work in concert with a separate strain of discourse that emphasizes the 
rapidity with which the Singularity could occur.  Vinge (2008) illustrates this type of claim, 
musing,   
One moment the world is like 2008, perhaps more heavily networked.  People are 
still debating the possibility of the singularity. And then something…happens.  I 
don’t mean the accidental construction that Brooks describes.  What I’m thinking 
would probably be the result of intentional research, perhaps a group exploring 
the parameter space of their general theory.  One of their experiments finally gets 
things right.  The result transforms the world—in just a matter of hours.  A hard 
takeoff into the singularity could resemble a physical explosion more than it does 
technological progress.  (para 29)  
Similar terminology appears in Miller (2012), who notes that, despite its improbability, “an 
intelligence explosion could, literally, happen tomorrow” (p. 209).  Chalmers (2010) employs 
parallel language, writing that, “this event will be followed by an explosion to ever-greater levels 
of intelligence” (p. 1).  
 However, the rhetorical emphasis on the explosiveness of the Singularity indicates a 
difficulty in controlling the event, suggesting in turn a need for the audience’s immediate 
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consideration.  Such a strategy encourages the audience to view the Singularity as inevitable. 
Therefore, the greatest risk is willful ignorance.  
The Means of Protection (Producing a Positive Singularity) 
 Given the uncertainty, Singularitarians focus on a potentially transformative future.  
Vinge (1993) articulates this techno-utopia as “the Asimov Dream,” writing,  
Imagine a willing slave, who has 1000 times your capabilities in every way. 
Imagine a creature who could satisfy your every safe wish (whatever that means) 
and still have 99.9% of its time free for other activities.  There would be a new 
universe we never really understood, but filled with benevolent gods.  (p. 16) 
Invoking Asimov’s famous “Laws of Robotics,” Singularitarians emphasize the need to shape 
the development of ultra-intelligence to produce a positive outcome.  Chalmers (2010) suggests 
that a benevolent Singularity might be the product of internal and external constraints on 
technological progress.  
 Internal constraints.  Chalmers (2010) notes of ultra-intelligent machines, “we might try 
to constrain their cognitive capacities in certain respects, so that they are good at certain tasks 
with which we need help, but so they lack certain key features such as autonomy” (p. 24).  In 
particular, internal constraints are often described in terms of values.  Kurzweil (2005), for 
example, contends that in order to deal with significantly advanced artificial intelligence, “Our 
primary strategy in this area should be to optimize the likelihood that future nonbiological 
intelligence will reflect our values of liberty, tolerance, and respect for knowledge and diversity” 
(p. 424).  And, Brooks (2008) echoes this means of control, arguing, “By being careful about 
what we instill in our machines, we simply won’t create the specific conditions necessary for a 
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runaway, self-perpetuating artificial intelligence explosion that runs beyond our control and 
leaves us in the dust” (para 37).  
 Through these accounts, Singularitarians emphasize the importance of advanced but 
benevolent machines.  However, “Intelligence is inherently impossible to control” (Kurzweil, 
2005, p. 409).  Thus, internal constraints are necessary but potentially insufficient for producing 
a positive Singularity.  In this case, there is a need for “defensive technologies” (p. 409), external 
constraints that could undermine the proliferation of malevolent machines.  
 External constraints.  Chalmers (2010) worries that, “Even if we have designed these 
systems to be benign, we will want to verify that they are benign before allowing them unfettered 
access to our world” (p. 29).  Specifically, he outlines two concerns: “First, humans and AI may 
be competing for common physical resources: space, energy, and so on.  Second, embodied AI 
systems will have the capacity to act physically upon us, potentially doing us harm” (p. 29).  In 
either of these scenarios, the values imbued as internal constraints might not be enough to ensure 
the benevolence of ultra-intelligence.  Instead, what humans must do is develop both safe 
methods for implementing ultra-intelligence and means for responding to their potential 
malevolence.  
 Kurzweil (2005) suggests that external constraints are an issue of public policy, and are 
best approached as existential risks.  He writes, “In terms of public policy the task at hand is to 
rapidly develop the defensive steps needed, which include ethical standards, legal standards, and 
defensive technologies themselves” (p. 416).  In particular, he contends that, “the bulk of this 
investment today should be in (biological) antiviral medications and treatment” (p. 422), 
including reforms in the regulatory processes and ethical guidelines currently shaping 
developments in biotechnology.  Additionally, Kurzweil likens the need for oversight and 
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preemptive actions (i.e. policing by international organizations and authorities) regarding 
technological progress to the ways in which missiles, biological viruses, and software viruses are 
currently handled (2005).   
 In sum, the final element of utopian Singularitarian discourse asks the audience to 
consider and adhere to the vision.  This is achieved by two interrelated rhetorical strategies.  
First, Singularitarians implore the audience to engage in productive, preparatory strategies before 
they lose the ability to control the outcome.  Second, Singularitarians’ endorse methods for 
curtailing the risks of ultra-intelligence.  The result is an argument that suggests the audience 
should embrace something beyond their material experiences with technology and modify their 
beliefs and behaviors to achieve such transcendence.   
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Singularitarian rhetoric is a particular variant of 
techno-utopianism.  To accomplish this, I first suggested that utopian discourse consists of three 
interrelated strategies, including the identification of barriers to transcendence, the means for 
overcoming such barriers, and a justification for the audience’s adherence to the utopian 
trajectory.  Techno-utopianism, as a contemporary strain of utopian discourse, highlights the role 
of technology in achieving a transcendent future.  
 Having established a pattern and relevant themes underlying techno-utopian rhetoric, I 
illuminated the form of Singularitarian discourse.  In particular, Singularitarians identify both 
material and ideological barriers to techno-transcendence.  As a means for transcending these 
narrow accounts of progress, Singularitarians employ evolutionary discourse to encourage 
audience members to see their vision as part of natural trajectory for humans.  Also, 
Singularitarians point to advances in relevant fields (biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and 
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nanotechnology) as evidence of the subtle but significant progress towards their vision.  Finally, 
Singularitarians attempt to justify the audience’s attention and adherence by characterizing the 
event in risk-based terms.  
 Thus, Singularitarian discourse mirrors the persuasive form of techno-utopianism.  As 
Nordmann (2008) notes, the “singularitarian myth” (p. 4) has become a captivating story.  Vance 
(2010) suggests that one reason for the salience of this discourse is the “modern-day, quasi-
religious answer to the Fountain of Youth” (p. 2) it offers potential adherents.  Popper (2012) 
argues that Singularitarians have made a “religion of rationality” (p. 3).  These sentiments reflect 
the unique use of science and technology as an entry point into the realm of the symbolic.   
Specifically, the Singularitarian story begins with rationalistic discourse, and then 
narratively transports the audience to a perfect future.  In between the audience’s contemporary 
experience with technology is cited in support of a vision of techno-utopia to come.  Yet, the 
fantastic account of an intelligence explosion suggests something beyond technical reason.  
Ultimately, current science cannot describe the approaching utopia. Thus, in the Singularity, the 
distinction between rationalistic and mythic discourse blurs, as Singularitarians draw on the 
vocabulary of science and technology to present a vision of transcendence that is fundamentally 
mythic, not scientific, in nature.   
There is an apparent paradox at the heart of this chapter. Nearly all the pro-Singularity 
positions I have describe are highly rationalistic, but the conclusion to the Singularitarian 
narrative is based in myth, a vision of a perfect future—a techno-utopia—to come. Kurzweil and 
others have made reason their god, but they describe a utopia in which present conceptions of 
reason have been transcended. In that way, the description of the post-Singularity world is 
fundamentally mythic. For Kurzweil, god will soon be in the machine. 
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To be a Singularitarian, then, is to embrace a cultural narrative that intertwines technical 
and narrative discourse, promoting a benevolent account of the future.  Yet, while the 
Singularitarian myth attracts many, it is not without its detractors.  In the next chapter, “The 
Robot, the Bomb, and the Future,” I describe anti-Singularity discourse to determine the form of 
responses to techno-transcendence.   
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Chapter Four: The Bomb, the Robot, and the Future 
The Singularitarian trajectory culminates in mythic transcendence.  For those audience 
members willing to embrace technology as the next step in the human story, Singularitarian 
rhetors promise a fundamental, existential transformation.  As Brooks (2008) notes, “Some 
singularitarians believe our world will become a kind of techno-utopia, with humans 
downloading their consciousness into machines to live a disembodied, after-death life” (para 6).  
Yet, Vance (2010) observes in an examination of the Singularitarian culture that, “one person’s 
utopia is another person’s dystopia” (para 11).  Similarly, Joy (2000) argues that, “A 
technological approach to Eternity – near immortality through robotics – may not be the most 
desirable utopia, and its pursuit brings clear dangers” (p. 15).  Brooks (2008), articulating those 
dangers, suggests that some “anticipate a kind of technodamnation in which intelligent machines 
will be in conflict with humans, maybe waging war against us” (para 6).  These sentiments are 
typical of an influential counter-narrative, broadly described as anti-Singularity discourse, which 
suggests that the perils, rather than the promises, of technology should inform social and cultural 
attitudes.  
Whereas Singularitarian rhetoric relies on mythic reasoning, allowing the audience to tap 
transcendent truth, anti-Singularity discourse acts as a secondary allegory (Milford, 2010).  Here, 
audiences symbolically extract meaning from a variety of social and cultural texts and use them 
to imbue a pre-text with contemporary relevance.  Specifically, I argue that anti-Singularity 
rhetoric relies on a confluence of two strains of discourse, historical examples of technology 
gone awry and dystopian science fiction, to produce pessimistic social truths towards technology.  
Thus, in the remainder of this chapter, I use the form and function of secondary allegory 
to illuminate the rhetorical strategies underlying anti-Singularity discourse.  To accomplish this, I 
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first examine the use of historical examples of technology gone wrong as pre-texts for 
technological anxiety.  Next, I identify the role of science fiction in informing skeptical 
perspectives towards the Singularity.  Then, I detail the resultant narrative themes, prevalent 
throughout much anti-Singularity discourse, that act as social truths and encourage audiences to 
approach technology pessimistically.  
Given the prevalence of anti-Singularity rhetoric in academic, technical, and popular 
discussions of technological progress, much of this analysis draws on Bill Joy’s (2000) article, 
“Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us.”  Joy, co-founder of Sun Microsystems and a “key player in 
the Internet boom and development of the Web” (“Bill Joy,” 2014, para 2), penned the now 
“well-known piece” (Messerly, 2011, para 1) that has become an oft-cited foundation for 
skeptics.  As Barrat (2013) notes, “In nonscholarly literature and lectures about the perils of AI, I 
think only Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics are cited more frequently, albeit misguidedly, than 
Joy’s hugely influential essay” (p. 134).  Accordingly, many of the prevailing themes in anti-
Singularity discourse build on or extrapolate from Joy’s text, and the following analysis reflects 
this treatment.    
The Form of Anti-Singularity Discourse 
 Much research suggests that traditional notions of allegory cannot adequately account for 
the contemporary relationship between narrative and how audiences form attitudes (Milford, 
2010; Milford & Rowland, 2012; Phair, 2010).  Specifically, these scholars contend that the 
proliferation of media and resonant narratives have produced alternative allegorical forms, not 
necessarily requiring single, sacred pre-texts, as in traditional allegory.  Instead, contemporary 
allegory might also be understood as the confluence of various narratives (including but not 
limited to popular culture), and shared historical or cultural experiences that act as pre-texts 
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(Milford, 2010; Milford & Rowland, 2012).  This form of secondary allegory, which has the 
audience extract symbolic meaning from a variety of texts and cluster them around a relevant 
pre-text, is a useful means for understanding anti-Singularity discourse.  
  In particular, I argue that anti-Singularity rhetoric relies on two strategies for establishing 
pre-texts.  First, these rhetors use historical examples of the destructive side of technology as 
pre-texts for cautious perspectives towards technological progress, with a specific emphasis on 
the atomic bomb.  Second, these rhetors invoke popular science fiction to both encourage 
audiences to interpret current advances in dystopian terms and simultaneously undermine the use 
of science fiction as a rhetorical shield in defense of Singularitarian perspectives.  In the 
following section, I illuminate these two strategies. 
History as Pre-Text  
 Anti-Singularity rhetoric references historical examples of destructive technology to 
provide audiences with evidence for technological pessimism.  These examples function as pre-
texts: true accounts of technology’s negative effects that can imbue contemporary analogues with 
new meaning.  The internal logic of this strategy is illustrated by Barrat’s (2013) observation 
that, “We’ve learned what happens when technologically advanced beings run into less advanced 
ones: Christopher Columbus versus the Tiano, Pizzaro versus the Inca, Europeans versus Native 
Americans.  Get ready for the next one.  Artificial superintelligence versus you and me” (p. 30).  
Here, Barrat (2013) establishes a symbolic pattern that characterizes artificial intelligence and 
humans in a dyadic relationship of oppressor and oppressed, and history becomes a vehicle for 
giving contemporary technological progress new (or additional) meaning.  In particular, a focus 
on the atomic bomb has become an abiding theme in anti-Singularity discourse.  
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 The atomic bomb.  Anti-Singularity rhetors reference the atomic bomb as an example of 
the problems of firm commitments to scientific and technological progress.  This strategy is 
articulated by Joy (2000), who argues, “We should have learned a lesson from the making of the 
first atomic bomb and the resulting arms race. We didn’t do well then, and the parallels to our 
current situation are troubling” (p. 10).  Again, the emphasis on an historical catastrophe wrought 
by technology symbolically shapes contemporary practices.  And, by analogizing the two 
situations, anti-Singularity rhetors develop two powerful strains of argument: the problem of 
motives and the problem of outcomes.  
 Kenneth Burke worries that implicit in social, cultural, or ideological commitments to 
technological progress are a psychosis, a potentially misguided belief that “The opportunities to 
produce further and further ‘generations’ of contrivances are indistinguishable from the 
compulsions to do so” (1984, p. 396).  Burke’s concern is one of motive: that possibility acts as a 
substitute for desirability.  This sentiment informs much anti-Singularity discourse, and is 
illustrated in references to the atomic bomb.  For example, Joy (2000) contends,  
Now, as then, we are creators of new technologies and stars of the imagined 
future, driven – this time by great financial rewards and global competition – 
despite the clear dangers, hardly evaluating what it may be like to try to live in a 
world that is the realistic outcome of what we are creating and imagining.  (p. 12)  
In this passage, Joy (2000) symbolically aligns the Singularity with an historical disaster.  Joy 
crystallizes this point, arguing that, “Failing to understand the consequences of our inventions 
while we are in the rapture of discovery and innovation seems to be a common fault of our 
scientists and technologists” (p. 6).  Thus, the Singularity, like the atomic bomb, illustrates the 
means by which motive can become blindness.    
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Having symbolically equated the two events by analogizing their emphasis on motive 
rather than outcome, Joy then argues that there is no need to push for the Singularity, “This time 
– unlike during the Manhattan Project – we aren’t in a war, facing an implacable enemy that is 
threatening our civilization; we are driven, instead, by our habits, our desires, our economic 
system, and our competitive need to know” (p. 13).  Combined with his criticisms of 
deterministic motives, this claim creates a robust indictment of the Singularitarian commitment 
to technological progress: it was wrong to privilege motives in the past, it would be far worse to 
privilege lesser motives in the present.  A separate strain of discourse more directly articulates 
the effect of such motives by referencing the atomic bomb to illustrate a possible outcome of 
rigid commitments to technology.  
As Barrat (2013) notes, “With the invention and use of nuclear weapons, we humans 
demonstrated that we are capable of ending the lives of most of the world’s inhabitants” (p. 14).  
Here, Barrat underscores the significance of that historical moment when global destruction 
became a reality.  Yet, as a measure of catastrophe, parallels to the atomic bomb function as 
symbolic floors rather than ceilings.  Barrat continues, “Or maybe you have not yet grasped how 
artificial intelligence could pose an existential threat to mankind, a threat greater than nuclear 
weapons or any other technology you can think of” (2013, p. 16). Joy (2000) adds, 
I frankly believe that the situation in 1945 was simpler than the one we now face. 
The nuclear technologies were reasonably separable into commercial and military 
uses, and monitoring was aided by the nature of atomic tests and the ease with 
which radioactivity could be measured.  (p. 14)  
The situation is more threatening today.  The Singularity “will not require large facilities or rare 
raw materials. Knowledge alone will enable the use of them” (p. 4).  Joy concludes, “we are on 
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the cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility spreads well beyond 
that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to nation-sates, on to a surprising and 
terrible empowerment of extreme individuals” (2000, p. 4).  
Anti-Singularity discourse, then, establishes an historical analogue for interpreting 
contemporary technological progress.  Comparisons to the atomic bomb illuminate the problems 
of overly deterministic motives and the potential for disaster.  Yet, the identification of parallels 
between the past and the present is an incomplete rendering of anti-Singularity rhetoric.  This 
strategy also relies on a separate strain of discourse to articulate the perils of technological 
optimism, popular dystopian narratives about the future.  
The Role of Science Fiction in Anti-Singularity Discourse 
 Science fiction and contemporary technology are intimately bound to one another.  Many 
of the most influential scientists and technologists were inspired by the stories of a future made 
better through technology.  For example, Bill Joy (2000) describes the original Star Trek series 
as formative, writing,  
Roddenberry’s vision of the centuries to come was one with strong moral values, 
embodied in codes like the Prime Directive: to not interfere in the development of 
less technologically advanced civilizations.  This had an incredible appeal to me; 
ethical humans, not robots, dominated this future, and I took Roddenberry’s 
dream as part of my own.  (p. 5) 
Here, science fiction acts as a guiding light for significant technological advances.  And, while 
“Golden Age” science fiction was motivating young inventors and entrepreneurs, initial work on 
artificial intelligence “inspired sci-fi writers like Arthur C. Clarke” (Horgan, 2008, para 14).  As 
such, optimistic narratives about technology and the future begot progress, and vice versa.  
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 Yet, such optimism subsided.  Emerging concerns about the future formed a counter-
narrative to hopeful tales of discovery through science.  I. J. Good, a pioneer in modern 
computing, highlights this turn in his now foundational work on artificial intelligence, noting,  
Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man ever need 
make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under 
control. It is curious that this point is made so seldom outside of science fiction.  
It is sometimes worthwhile to take science fiction seriously.  (p. 3) 
Barrett (1979) adds that “there is no doubt that the suspicion of technology has become so 
widespread that the dominant myth of our time may very well become that of Frankenstein’s 
monster” (p. 24).  
Anti-Singularity discourse, as the contemporary manifestation of concerns about 
technological progress, invokes these pessimistic, dystopian science fiction narratives.  In 
particular, I argue that anti-Singularity rhetors draw on science fiction in two ways.  First, 
science fiction acts as a pre-text, encouraging audiences to extract dystopian themes and apply 
them to their current situation.  Second, and alternatively, science fiction can be used to 
undermine technical conversations about the risks of technology.  
Science fiction as a pre-text.  Anti-Singularity discourse often invokes elements of 
dystopian narratives to encourage audiences to cautiously or pessimistically approach 
technological progress.  In building this argument, I first describe common dystopian science 
fiction about technology, and then I show how anti-Singularity discourse draws upon this 
literature.  
Perhaps the first iteration of such stories, Judaism’s Golem, “revolves around the 
animation of an inanimate statue” (Kove, 2000, p. 217) and suggests that it is the “creator of the 
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golem who is responsible for controlling the growth of the creature’s power” (Covino, 1996, p. 
360).  Covino (1996) notes that, “he [the golem] functions like a machine, prompting the 
observation that products of both magic and mechanism serve the same impulse” (p. 363).  The 
golem archetype is symbolically extracted from a mythic, religious system and given new 
meaning through technological discourse.  Covino continues, “Like the golem who goes on an 
unintended rampage of death and destruction, the automaton will carry out directives without 
critical consciousness or conscience, even to the point of catastrophe” (p. 364).  
In 1920, the destructive automaton was given an enduring identity in Karel Capek’s 
R.U.R.  The story, which follows the development of and subsequent domination by robots, 
integrates the perils of the golem with the increasing interaction between humans, machines, and 
society (Horokova & Kelemen, no date).  The robot, now the symbol for artificial intelligence 
(Barrat, 2013), has become a “venerable trope in movies, books, and films” (Barrat, 2013, p. 88), 
often with dystopian themes. 
For example, the early 1980s produced two such narratives that have gained near-
canonical cultural status.  Both Blade Runner (1982) and The Terminator (1984) highlight the 
problem of intelligent machines run amok.  In both stories, the audience encounters a protagonist 
tasked with protecting others from homicidal robots.  The Matrix (1999) offers an updated 
account of dominant technology, featuring a hero waging a war against intelligent machines bent 
on harvesting humans for energy.  Notably, even optimistic accounts of artificial intelligence 
have been overshadowed by the prevalence of technological pessimism.  
The movie, I, Robot (2004), a title drawn from a famous collection of Isaac Asimov’s 
robot stories, abandons Asimov’s sympathetic reading of robots in favor of a vision of 
malevolent machines determined to eradicate their creators.  Additionally, Braine (1994) notes 
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that changes in Star Trek, from the original series through the popular The Next Generation, 
illustrate the increasing influence of dystopian themes.  Braine (1994) writes,  
distinctive features of The Next Generation—the fascination with, and 
domestication of, the technical realm, the suggestion of uncertainty about the 
future, the predilection for inner life over outer exploration, the emphasis on 
physical safety and emotional security—related it to many contemporary 
concerns, including growing ambivalence about the technological, and set it apart 
from the earlier show.  (p. 4) 
Here, anxiety about technological progress drives the narrative.  Audiences are offered a variety 
of examples from which to choose the symbolic representative for technology gone awry.  And, 
anti-Singularity discourse frequently invokes these symbols to align contemporary advances with 
malignant analogues.  
 Joy (2000), who, as noted, was inspired by Roddenberry’s vision of the future, reflects 
skeptically on Singularitarian accounts of the future of technology, which remind him of “the 
Borg of Star Trek, a hive of partly biological, partly robotic creatures with a strong destructive 
streak.” (p. 4)?  Moreover, while evaluating likely outcomes of artificial intelligence, Barrat 
(2013) invokes HAL9000, the homicidal computer from 2001: A Space Odyssey, and Skynet, the 
genesis program for the self-aware robots of The Terminator.  Critics of the Singularity, then, 
consistently invoke science fiction to make sense of technology.    
This discursive strategy treats popular, dystopian science fiction as a pre-text for 
understanding contemporary technological progress.  Audiences are encouraged to extract 
elements from these narratives that might inform skeptical or pessimistic attitudes towards 
technology.  The result is that dystopian science fiction becomes a map for understanding the 
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Singualrity.  Yet, anti-Singularitarians also argue that utopian science fiction about technology 
insulates pro-Singularity discourse from critical discussion.  
Science fiction as disruptive.  Anti-Singularity rhetors criticize utopian science fiction as 
a subversive element in public discourse about technology.  In particular, these rhetors suggest 
that popular accounts of a utopian future can obscure the risks of technology.  For instance, 
Barrat (2013) notes that the popularity of artificial intelligence “as entertainment has inoculated 
AI from serious consideration in the not-so-entertaining category of catastrophic risks” (p. 26).  
Additionally, the tendency of these accounts to lionize human protagonists entrenches this 
problem.  Barrat (2013) observes that in popular narratives the odds are often “heavily in favor 
of the hard-bitten team of unorthodox AI professionals who just might be crazy enough to stand 
a chance.  Everywhere else in the universe the ASI [artificial strong intelligence] team would 
mop the floor with the humans” (p. 14).  Audiences, then, encounter technology as a drama, 
lifted from the technical realm, and see themselves as immune to the risks of progress.  
Yudkowsky (2008) articulates the significance of this discursive shift, from technical to 
dramatic, arguing that these stories  
do not propose complex relations between initial conditions and outcomes—that 
would lose the audience.  But we need relational understanding to manipulate the 
future, steer it into a region palatable to humankind.  If we do not steer, we run the 
danger of ending up where we are going.  (p. 10)  
Thus, the danger in dramatizing the perils of technological progress is that audiences are 
unable to engage substantive issues regarding technology.  
A particular iteration of this tension, between dramatic and technical discourses, is the 
frequent appearance of Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” in research regarding artificial 
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intelligence.  Asimov’s now famous “Three Laws” establish the rules governing robots 
throughout many of his stories, and emphasize the protection of humans and the obedience of 
machines.  For instance, the first law states, “A robot may not injure a human being or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm” (“Isaac Asimov’s,” 2001, para 1).  The second 
law states, “A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would 
conflict the First Law” (“Isaac Asimov’s,” 2001, para 2).  And the third law states, “A robot 
must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or 
Second Law” (“Isaac Asimov’s,” 2001, para 3).  
For many anti-Singularity rhetors, though, one problem is the treatment of these laws as 
established methods for safely limiting artificial intelligence.  For example, Barrat (2013) claims, 
“unreliable as Asimov’s laws are, they’re our most often cited attempt to codify our future 
relationship with intelligent machines” (p. 21).  In fact, so ingrained into scientific and technical 
discourse are the “Three Laws” that they are often treated as “settled science” (p. 4), indicating 
that even “some of the most accomplished scientists” (p. 4) have “spent little time thinking or 
exchanging ideas about the problem” (p. 4).  Similarly, Yudkowsky (2008) observes that the 
“Three Laws” are the “major reference in common” (p. 38) throughout work on friendly AI, 
artificial intelligence programmed to be benevolent.  Here, popular narratives become a 
substitute for substantive conversations about the risks of technology.  And notably, Asimov’s 
“Three Laws” are not necessarily followed in current AI research.  
For anti-Singularity rhetors, then, popular utopian science fiction plays an integral role in 
shaping the public imagination on issues of technology and the future.  And, Barrat (2013) notes 
that this, in effect, shields pro-Singularity discourse from criticism, writing, “When a dystopian 
viewpoint rears its head, many bloggers, editorialists, and technologists reflexively fend it off 
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with some version of ‘Oh no, not the Terminator again!  Haven’t we heard enough gloom and 
doom from Luddites and pessimists?” (p. 26).  Consequently, anti-Singularity rhetoricians 
become fringe participants in “the most important conversation humanity can have” (Barrat, 
2013, p. 16) about “the single most dangerous risk we face” (Yudkowsky, 2008, p. 43).  
In sum, popular science fiction functions in two ways in anti-Singularity discourse.  First, 
anti-Singularity rhetors invoke elements of dystopian science fiction to help audiences 
symbolically align contemporary technological progress with powerful images of destruction.  In 
this way, science fiction becomes an allegorical pre-text.  Alternatively, anti-Singularity rhetors 
decry the use of utopian science fiction to both desensitize audiences to the risks of technology 
and subvert the role of technical, cautionary assessments of progress.  Yet, while it might appear 
that these two treatments of science fiction are inconsistent, their contrast illustrates the 
allegorical form of anti-Singularity discourse.  
For instance, Pensky (2014) notes, “Kurzweil is perhaps best known for his science 
fiction-sounding predictions about the future” (para 5) and that the “Singularity makes for great 
science fiction, but not much else” (para 33).  Similarly, another critic “worries that so many 
people, smart people, are taking Kurzweil’s sci-fi fantasies seriously” (“Ray Kurzweil’s,” 2010, 
para 12).  These objections to the Singularity make clear the distinction in rhetorical form 
between pro- and anti-Singularity discourses.  While Singularitarians embrace a mythic 
trajectory, anti-Singularity rhetors deny the possibility of transcendence through technology.  
Rather, they encourage audiences to cobble together a variety of shared experiences or stories 
(history and science fiction) to make sense of technology.  And, the resulting, cautionary 
discourse produces social truths about the risks of technological progress.   
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Social Truths 
 As a form of secondary allegory, anti-Singularity rhetoric treats historical and narrative 
examples as pre-texts, providing symbolic reservoirs from which audiences can extract meaning 
as they encounter technology.  The goal of such symbolic extraction is to produce pessimistic or 
dystopian attitudes towards technological progress.  In this section, I argue that anti-Singularity 
rhetors seek to produce two social truths about technology.  First, anti-Singularity discourse 
emphasizes the potential for destruction implicit in artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, 
robotics, and the like.  Second, these rhetors employ entelechial reasoning to emphasize the 
rapidity and magnitude of a Singularity-driven catastrophe.  
The End of Humanity 
 Anti-Singularity rhetors encourage audiences to see the destructive potential of 
technology.  Much of their strategy for accomplishing this goal is to describe the possible 
outcomes of the Singularity and technologies that might come out of it as posing “a different 
threat than the technologies that have come before” (Joy, 2000, p. 4).  For example, Barrat 
(2013) notes “one big problem with AI disasters.  They’re not like airplane disasters, nuclear 
disasters, or any other kind of technology disaster with the possible exception of 
nanotechnology.  That’s because there’s a high probability we won’t recover from the first one” 
(p. 28).  Joy (2000) worries that “on this path humanity may well be lost” (p. 7).  He continues, 
“An immediate consequence of the Faustian bargain of obtaining the great power of 
nanotechnology is that we run a grave risk – the risk that we might destroy the biosphere on 
which all life depends” (p. 9).  As such, the Singularity and related technologies might “wipe 
humanity from the face of the Earth” (Popper, 2012, para 24) and make the “clear danger of 
extinction” (Joy, 2000, p. 13) a very real possibility.        
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 One function, then, of anti-Singularity discourse is to characterize the destructive 
potential of technology in extreme terms.  And, by delineating the potential destruction of the 
Singularity and related technologies from significant, past examples of catastrophe, these rhetors 
imply that no historical frame of reference can adequately contextualize contemporary risks.  
Yudkowsky (2008) argues that the lack of relevant comparisons makes current technology more 
dangerous than those that caused previous disasters, writing  
We cannot consult actuarial statistics to assign small annual probabilities of 
catastrophe, as with asteroid strikes.  We cannot use calculations from a precise, 
precisely confirmed model to rule out events or place infinitesimal upper bounds 
on their probability, as with proposed with physical disasters.  But this makes AI 
more worrisome, not less.  (p. 1) 
As such, anti-Singularity rhetors offer a means for making sense of technological destruction by 
employing entelechial reasoning, symbolically integrating historical and narrative examples to 
illustrate the danger of seeking perfection through AI.  
Entelechial Technology 
 In A Rhetoric of Motives (1969), Kenneth Burke articulates a concept of entelechy in 
which the essence of a thing is defined “narratively in terms of its fulfillment or fruition” (p. 13).  
Rowland and Frank (2011) add to this, describing entelechy as “a symbolic force that causes 
humans to extend an idea to the ‘end of the line’ in search of perfection, which often produces 
terrible results” (p. 43).  I argue that anti-Singularity rhetoric relies heavily on entelechial 
reasoning to suggest to audiences that the birth of artificial intelligence will necessarily lead to 
its farthest, most destructive end.  This is accomplished by symbolically integrating historical 
and narrative pre-texts to produce a perfect vision of an evil future. 
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For example, Joy (2000) contends, “once an intelligent robot exists, it is only a small step 
to a robot species – to an intelligent robot that can make evolved copies of itself” (p. 7).  
Similarly, Barrat (2013) describes the risk of “rapid recursive self-improvement that enables an 
AI to bootstrap itself from artificial general intelligence to artificial superintelligence.  It’s 
commonly called the ‘intelligence explosion’” (p. 100).  Yudkowsky (2008) also identifies a 
runaway scenario, noting, 
The AI becomes smarter, including becoming smarter at the task of writing the 
internal cognitive functions of an AI, so the AI can rewrite its existing cognitive 
functions to work even better, which makes the AI still smarter, including smarter 
at the task of rewriting itself, so that it makes yet more improvements.  (p. 17)  
Thus, the first AI makes possible the most destructive version of AI.  
Additionally, advances that promote self-replication are uniquely identified by their 
entelechial potential.  As Joy (2000) suggests, “robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share 
a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate.  A bomb is blown up only once – but one 
bot can become many, and quickly get out of control” (p. 4).  He concludes, “It is most of all the 
power of destructive self-replication in genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics (GNR) that 
should give us pause” (p. 9).  Barrat (2013) more explicitly describes the problem of self-
replication, writing 
The first replicator would make one copy of itself, and there’d be two replicators 
making the third and fourth copies.  The next generation would make eight 
replicators total, the next sixteen, and so on.  If each replicator took a minute and 
a half to make, at the end of ten hours there’d be more than 68 billion replicators; 
and near the end of two days they would own the earth.  (p. 15) 
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The entelechial reasoning is obvious.   
The above accounts intimate a very fast timeline between the birth of AI and destruction 
of humanity.  Such reasoning directly confronts a major tenet of pro-Singularity discourse, 
Kurzweil’s “Law of Accelerating Returns,” which optimistically characterizes rapid progress as 
the necessary path to transcendence.  Barrat (2013) most clearly articulates this point, “Instead of 
leading to a kind of paradise, as Kurzweil’s aggregate projections assert, I believe the Law of 
Accelerating Returns describes the shortest possible distance between our lives as they are and 
the end of the human era” (p. 131).  
 Moreover, anti-Singularity rhetors invoke dystopian science fiction to crystallize their 
entelechial concerns.  For example, Barrat (2013) describes recent technological mishaps with AI 
in narrative terms, writing, “These aren’t full-blown Terminator incidents, but look for more of 
them ahead” (p. 60).  And Satell (2013b) notes, “The Terminator was, of course, a work of 
fiction, but the idea of cyborgs and killer machines is not all that farfetched” (para 23).  Again, 
the Singularitarian symbolic system is treated as inherently entelechial, leading to the types of 
disasters in dystopian science fiction.  The Borg, the Terminator, and previously discussed 
references to HAL9000 act as narrative shorthands, inviting audiences to understand technology 
in terms of its malevolent perfection.     
 In sum, anti-Singularity rhetoric relies heavily on entelechial reasoning to make sense of 
the risks of technology.  These rhetors encourage audiences to approach AI research with 
caution, highlighting the risks of uncontrollable technological change.  Anti-Singularity 
discourse invokes examples of technological catastrophe both in the real world and also in the 
imagined world of science fiction to support their worldview, urging audiences to see technology 
in terms of a destructive analogue.  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that anti-Singularity discourse relies on a combination of 
historical and science fiction narratives, acting as allegorical pre-texts, to encourage audiences to 
approach technology from a dystopian perspective.  To illustrate this argument, I first outlined 
the prevalence of historical examples, the atomic bomb, in particular, throughout anti-Singularity 
texts.  Here, I illuminated two emergent concerns about technological optimism.  First, such 
optimists are blinded by their motives, confusing opportunity and need in relation to 
technological progress.  And second, even the relevant historical analogues for destruction by 
technology lack the scope necessary for comprehending contemporary risks.  
 Having established the role of history as an allegorical pre-text, I turned to popular 
science fiction.  Anti-Singularity discourse suggests the medium can be both productively and 
subversively used.  For their purposes, anti-Singularity rhetors see value in symbolically aligning 
current technology with dystopian images (the Terminator, the Borg, etc.).  Alternatively, these 
rhetors decry the use of popular science fiction to undermine skeptical discussions of technology.  
In particular, some of these critics worry that such narratives serve to shield pro-Singularity 
discourse from criticism.  
Next, I illustrated the prevalence of two social truths emerging from anti-Singularity 
rhetoric: that it is destructive beyond any historical imagination and that it should be understood 
entelechially.  First, this discourse suggests that historical analogues lack the magnitude of the 
risks associated with the Singularity and related technologies.  And, given a lack of frames for 
understanding such destruction, anti-Singularity rhetors invoke entelechial reasoning to make 
sense of technology.  Dystopian images become shorthand accounts of a possible future.  
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Thus, anti-Singularity discourse relies on a form of secondary allegorizing that challenges 
techno-transcendence and cautions audiences against technological optimism.  Having 
illuminated both the form and function of pro- and anti-Singularity rhetoric, in the next chapter, 
“2045: A Rhetorical Odyssey,” I discuss the implications of this study for public discourse 
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Chapter Five: 2045-A Rhetorical Odyssey 
 Public discourse about technology presents multiple and inconsistent views of 
technological change.  This varied public response can be traced to two competing attitudes 
about technology.  First, the public is excited about new gadgets and the companies that make 
them.  Second, people worry about the long-term effects of technology on their lives, and fear 
that the future might be worse as a result of technological advances.  In this study, I have argued 
that narrative forms become powerful rhetorical forces helping audiences to navigate the conflict 
between these competing perspectives and also to make sense of their own often-conflicting 
attitudes.  In particular, I identified the Singularity, a moment in which artificial intelligence 
reaches and surpasses human, as one strain of discourse illustrating such conflicting themes.  In 
this chapter, I both summarize that analysis and explain its implications for understanding the 
public’s relationship to technology and the social function of narrative forms.   
Summary 
Science and technology have become the dominant discourses of this era.  The increasing 
use of technical reasoning to understand the universe, a project beginning in the seventeenth 
century, has culminated in a technocratic discourse.  Here, science, technology, and history 
become powerful vocabularies for engaging and describing everyday experiences.  Yet, such 
discourse has proven ineffective at accounting for certain social or cultural crises.  In particular, 
this type of reasoning lacks the ability to engage value-based issues, evaluate moral conflicts, or 
confront psychological crises (Rowland, 1990).  For these problems, people often turn to myths.   
Building on previous work regarding rhetorical myth (Rowland, 1990), I suggested that 
certain stories act as symbolic equipment (Burke, 1973), providing audiences with solutions to 
certain social or cultural crises not accounted for in technical, rational, or scientific discourses.  
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Additionally, I argued that some science fiction narratives can function in this way, inspiring 
fantastic visions of the future that shape contemporary decisions regarding technology.  
Singularitarian rhetors, specifically, attempt to overcome cultural anxiety regarding 
technology by telling such stories.  In particular, Singularitarians encourage audiences to look 
beyond their everyday experiences with technology in favor of a utopian vision of the future.  
Here, the fantastic possibilities of technology, illustrated in much Golden Age science fiction, 
become the probable outcomes of contemporary progress.  To accomplish this, these rhetors 
emphasize the Singularity (and related technologies) as the next step in the long story of 
humanity.  Such discourse situates the audience in an evolutionary narrative, challenging them to 
abandon traditional, linear notions of technological progress.  In its place, Singularitarians offer 
the exponential pace of evolution as evidence for a rapidly approaching techno-utopia. The result 
of this narrative is transcendence, a technologically enhanced life free from the frailty of biology 
or the perils of war, disease, and the like.  
 Having established the rhetorical form and function of Singularitarian rhetoric, I then 
turned to its counterpart.  Anti-Singularity discourse does not rely on mythic reasoning.  Rather, 
it exhibits a form more closely related to what Milford (2010) describes as secondary allegory.  
This type of rhetoric offers audiences a variety of images, acting as pre-texts, from which they 
can symbolically extract meaning to make sense of their experiences.  Particularly, anti-
Singularity discourse relies heavily on historical examples of technology gone wrong, with an 
emphasis on the atomic bomb, and references to dystopian icons (the Terminator, the Borg, etc.).  
These examples and images, then, provide audiences with new (or perhaps different) meaning 
for technological advances.  Thus, by symbolically aligning contemporary technology with 
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destructive or dystopian analogues, audience members are given reasons for pessimistic attitudes 
towards technology.    
 Thus, as a discourse, the Singularity is one example of the emergence of narrative forms 
to make sense of technological progress.  Where technocratic reasoning fails to engage social 
and cultural anxieties about technology, audiences are offered competing stories about the future.  
Singularitarians construct a mythic narrative of evolution culminating in techno-transcendence.  
Alternatively, anti-Singularity discourse draws on a variety of examples and images to encourage 
pessimistic attitudes about technology.  In the following section, then, I suggest some 
implications of this analysis regarding the public’s relationship to technology and the changing 
role of narrative forms in a technological era. 
Implications 
 This study offers two significant contributions regarding public discourse and 
technology.  First, I suggest that technological anxiety is likely entrenched (if not caused) by 
inconsistent popular narratives about technology.  Second, I argue that the influence of anti-
Singularity discourse blurs traditional distinctions between myth and allegory.  
The Public and Popular Accounts of Technology  
The resonance of Singularitarian rhetoric demonstrates a social or cultural need to make 
sense of technology and the inability of relevant discourses to accomplish such an end.  Vance 
(2010) notes, “The underlying premise of the Singularity responds to people’s insecurity about 
the speed of social and technological change in the computer era” (para 38).  Such anxiety might 
be explained by inconsistency in popular accounts of technology.  
For example, audiences are bombarded by messages touting the ways that technology can 
positively influence their everyday lives.  Simultaneously, dangerously advanced technology is 
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frequently portrayed as a villain in popular films, books, and video games.  Yet, while there 
might be a large gap between smartphones and homicidal robots, there is little public discourse 
that focuses in a balanced way on the pluses and minuses of technological change.  In fact, it is 
the failure of this kind of balanced technocratic reasoning to resonate that has created the space 
for the Singularity myth and also for its allegorical counterpart.  As Barrat (2013) observes,  
Too few people know that we need to have an ongoing internal conversation 
about AGI [artificial general intelligence] comparable to those we have about 
nuclear weapons. Too many people think the frontiers of AI are delineated by 
harmless search engines, smart phones, and now Watson. But AGI is much closer 
to nuclear weapons than to video games. (p. 155)  
Pro-Singularity advocates make similar arguments. Thus, the failure of technocratic reason to 
serve the needs of the audience creates the preconditions for the competing pro and anti-
technology narratives and therefore the resulting public sense of disquiet.   
Alternatively, audiences can turn to popular accounts of technological advances.  Steve 
Jobs’ famous presentations at Apple’s WorldWide Developers Conference (WWDC), for 
example, commanded public attention and seemed to generate much public discussion of 
technological progress.  But, these types of addresses often emphasize gadget lust, the “mystique 
and hype” (Sullivan, 2010, para 2) surrounding technology, rather than explaining the long-term 
implications of such advances.  Similarly, Barrat (2013) notes, the “inconvenient facts of AI risk 
are not as sexy as techno-journalism’s usual fare of dual core 3-D processors, capacitive touch 
screens, and the current hit app” (p. 26).  Here, popular mediated accounts again forego 
educational or critical appraisals of technology in favor of trends and novelty.  Consequently, 
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popular discussions of technology lack the explanatory power necessary to assuage cultural 
anxiety.   
 Thus, one implication of this study, then, is that the cacophony of available discourses for 
making sense of technology likely contributes to social or cultural anxiety about the future.  
Audiences are given reasons to be both hopeful and terrified of technological progress, but have 
few means for understanding the long-term implications of technology.  As such, pro and anti-
Singularity rhetoric, which illustrate the consequences of contemporary decisions about 
technology, helps fill in the gap to allow the public to process the potential of technological 
advances. 
The Role of Narrative 
This study is also important because it suggests significant implications related to the 
social or cultural function of narratives.  In particular, while many scholars suggest that a key, 
functional distinction between myth and allegory is the degree to which audiences believe the 
narrative to be true, I contend that this study illustrates the increasing power of certain allegories 
to function at the level of myth.  
Since Fisher’s (1984) foundational work on narratives, much research has attempted to 
appropriately define a rhetorical approach to stories (Warnick, 1986; Rowland, 1987; Rowland, 
1989).  One theme emerging from this research is the need for productive ways for critics to 
delineate certain rhetorical forms from others.  One method for accomplishing this is to tie 
together the function and form of the story.  As Rowland (2014) notes, “the most profitable place 
to look for useful narratives is at the intersection of form and function” (p. 13).  
For example, Rowland (1990) distinguishes between “myths that have to do with the 
serious matter of living life in terms of the order of society and of nature, and stories with some 
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of those same motifs that are told for entertainment” (p. 109).  He highlights Tolkien’s Lord of 
the Rings stories, which fulfill many of the formal elements of myths, but are not “presented as 
true” (p. 109) and therefore lack the ability to solve social or cultural problems not accounted for 
by other discourses.  This suggests the importance of stories that both exhibit the formal 
characteristics of myths and function as “a reality lived” (Malinowski, 1948, p. 100), narratively 
reflecting the audience’s situation.  
The Singularity is one of these stories.  The transcendent truth offered by Singularitarian 
rhetors requires a mythic form, although much of the supporting material is heavily rationalistic.  
The perfect future following the Singularity, however, is typical of myth.  Audiences must be 
able to see their material conditions in the symbolic terms of the narrative to believe as true the 
fantastic possibilities offered by technology.  For instance, the emphasis on evolution, which 
becomes a special time, and the future, a special place of existential transformation, provides 
audiences with new ways of seeing their contemporary situation.  Thus, audience members 
embrace the story of techno-transcendence as more than the combination of plot, characters, and 
setting.  The narrative provides them with new means for understanding their place in the 
universe and, most importantly, hope for a perfected future and immortality through technology.  
On the other hand, anti-Singularity discourse exhibits a different narrative form and, as 
such, a distinct rhetorical function.  First, these rhetors do not propose a transcendent end to 
technology.  Rather, they suggest that technological progress is likely to yield death and 
destruction.  To send this message, these rhetors draw on a variety of dystopian images and 
examples.  Here, well-known science fiction stories and historical examples of technological 
disaster function as symbolic reservoirs, from which audiences can draw meaning.   
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Importantly, though, while myth and allegory are often treated as distinct narrative forms, 
I argue that this study suggests that any line between them may blur in some cases.  In particular, 
I suggest that the prevalence of references to dystopian science fiction (the Terminator, 
HAL9000, etc.) in public discourse about the future demonstrates an increased reliance on 
allegorical narrative forms to convey social or cultural truths, a function often associated with 
myth.  This is not to say that audience members embrace the story of the Terminator as they 
embrace the story of the Bible, but rather that they use it understand the potential impact of 
technology on civilization.  In this way, certain allegories about technology function like myths 
in providing a worldview.  
Allegory is often used to tap into an underlying mythic system. Christian allegories of the 
Bible are one obvious example. That is not what is happening in anti-Singularity discourse. 
Rather, the allegories tap into stories that are not mythic in function/formal terms because the 
audience knows them to be science fiction, but some in the audience treat these fictional stories 
as serious representatives of a possible futre, thus blurring the line between allegory and myth.  
One explanation for this possible change is the increasing ubiquity of technology and 
science fiction about it.  As audiences become more reliant on, and simultaneously skeptical of, 
technology, some of the themes of dystopian science fiction seem like true accounts of a possible 
future.  While people have not experienced self-aware, malicious robots, they do have phones 
that talk to them and the imminent promise of self-driving vehicles.  Images of combat-ready 
robots flood the Internet, and stories of military drones have garnered significant media attention.  
In this way, the conditions of the present seem to suggest the possibility that dystopian stories 
depict the near future.  
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Thus, another implication of this study is that, in certain circumstances, dystopian 
allegories of technology and the future function in a way similar to traditional sacred myth.  
Audiences embrace these narratives as true because they seem to reflect the material conditions 
of technological progress and, as such, provide guidance in times of uncertainty.  
Conclusion 
 In this study, I have illuminated the form and function of pro and anti-Singularity 
discourse.  In doing so, I suggested that where technocratic discourse fails at accounting for 
social and cultural anxiety about technology, narrative forms become powerful resources for 
audiences.  Pro- Singularity discourse, which exhibits the form and function of a utopian myth, 
offers audience members a path to transcendence through the fantastic possibilities of 
technology.  Alternatively, anti-Singularity discourse, as a secondary allegory, encourages 
audiences to extract themes from historical and dystopian examples to form pessimistic attitudes 
towards technological progress.  
Additionally, this analysis has two significant implications regarding the public’s 
relationship to technology and the changing cultural role of narrative forms.  In particular, I 
argued that inconsistent accounts of technology in various relevant discourses have contributed 
to technological anxiety, and encouraged audiences to seek alternative means of making sense of 
the future.  Then, I illustrated the increasing cultural power of certain allegorical forms, which 
can function at the level of myth by tying audience’s contemporary experiences with technology 
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